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ABSTRACT 
	  
RELIGION AND SON PREFERENCE IN INDIA AND BANGLADESH: THREE 
ESSAYS ON COMPARING HINDUS AND MUSLIMS ON SON PREFERENCE AND 
SEX DIFFERENTIALS IN CHILD HEALTH 
 
Abhijit Visaria 
Michel Guillot	  
 
While the existence of son preference in south Asia is well-known, a gap in our 
understanding of the determinants of son preference is potential differences between 
religious groups. In this dissertation, I examine whether Hindus and Muslims in India and 
Bangladesh differ in terms of son preference. I find low daughter discrimination among 
Muslims and significant son preference among Hindus. I first analyze preferences for the 
ideal number and sex of children in India, and compare them to actual fertility behaviors 
that serve as a measure of sex selective abortion. I find that Muslim women are less likely 
to report a preference for sons in their ideal fertility responses. Analysis of parity-specific 
births conditional on the sex composition of previous children reveals that the odds of 
male births are higher than female births for only Hindus and specifically when the 
previously born children are only girls. In Chapter 2, I extend the analysis to stunting and 
childhood immunization. I find that Hindu girls are worse off compared to Hindu boys in 
terms of stunting when their older siblings are also girls. However, there are no sex 
differentials in immunization, which suggests that while Hindu girls are disadvantaged in 
terms of long-term intra-household access to nutrition, girls are not discriminated against, 
in either Hindu or Muslim families, when it comes to availing health services through a 
fixed number of low-cost or free events. In Chapter 3, I examine whether a group’s 
majority/minority status influences son preferences by comparing Hindu-majority and 
	   vii 
Muslim-minority India with Muslim-majority and Hindu-minority Bangladesh. Overall I 
do not find evidence for son preference among Muslims. In India, Hindus exhibit son 
preference in Hindu-majority clusters but not in Hindu-minority clusters. In Bangladesh, 
Hindus exhibit son preference in Hindu-minority areas but not Hindu-majority areas. This 
suggests that traditional, gender-biased norms prevail for a group with a majority at both 
the community and national levels. In Indian Hindu-minority clusters, the unique social 
and cultural environment with more gender-equitable norms influences Hindus. In 
Hindu-minority areas in Hindu-minority Bangladesh, traditional social norms may be 
reinforced through a greater threat perception and closely-knit networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is considerable evidence that son preference and its corollary, daughter 
discrimination or daughter aversion, have been and remain an enduring feature of south 
Asian, especially Indian, society. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between 
religious identity and demographic behaviors, thus far studied largely in terms of total 
fertility and contraceptive use, in an area of immense relevance in South Asia: son 
preference. In particular, I study differences between Hindus and Muslims in India and 
Bangladesh, using measures of both fertility and health, to examine the effect of a bias in 
favor of sons on ideal and actual fertility, as well as in terms of discriminatory behaviors 
affecting children’s health and nutritional outcomes.  
Examining this difference in India is important because religion is a key means of social 
stratification, with Hindus and Muslims on average strongly differentiated on educational 
and wealth measures. However in contrast to their lower socioeconomic status, child 
mortality among Muslim households in India is significantly lower compared to Hindus. 
Previous research has examined differences in son preference as a possible explanation 
for this paradox, and found that female child mortality is indeed lower among Muslims 
compared to Hindus where the family already has sons, but higher when the family 
already has girls. Thus the association of religious identity with son preference and 
differences between the two largest religious groups of India in demographic terms need 
to be nuanced and understood in greater detail.  
I study ideal fertility measures and sex ratios at birth, conditional on the number and sex 
composition of any previous children to assess the differences between Hindus and 
	   2 
Muslims in fertility preferences, and study sex differentials in child health outcomes in 
order to evaluate the extent to which son preference is manifested in discriminatory 
caregiver behaviors towards children differently between Hindus and Muslims. In trying 
to nuance the understanding of Hindu-Muslim differences, I also examine whether group 
majority/minority status at the level of the community influences son preferences, for 
which Bangladesh offers the opportunity with religious composition of population that is 
virtually the opposite of India’s. I use the publicly available Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) for all of the analysis in this dissertation.  
Let me briefly discuss Hindu-Muslim sex ratios at birth in India to set the basic context 
for the research that follows. In Table 1, I present sex ratios at birth in India for the 1996-
2004 period, obtained from the birth history collected from all eligible women in India’s 
DHS, the National Family and Health Surveys of 1998-99 and 2005-06. As Jha et al 
(2011) note, looking at a single measure of the sex ratios at birth may mask conditional 
sex ratios at higher parities that are skewed due to sex selective abortions. It is therefore 
important to calculate the sex ratio at birth for birth by parity, and for second and third-
parity births, ratios conditional on the sex of previous children. I calculate three-year 
rolling averages for the number of births, and the sex ratios are attributed to the mid-point 
year as shown in the table. I also calculate 99% confidence intervals using the delta 
method with variance 
 = Percent male / (N * [1-Percent male]).  
An inherent issue with calculating conditional sex ratios is that since the births in any 
given year are stratified by parity and sex composition of previous children, the cell sizes 
	   3 
are often fairly small. The confidence intervals are therefore large, and we see in Table 1 
that the problem is accentuated for births to Muslim mothers because of the relatively 
smaller size of the Muslim population in India. Nonetheless, I have highlighted in bold, 
the conditional sex ratios where the lower bound of the confidence interval exceeds 1.02 
male births per female birth.  
Overall, this analysis reveals that the sex ratios at birth appear to be skewed in favor of 
males only for Hindus. We also note that one condition where the sex ratio appears to be 
skewed is second-order births when the first child is a girl. This is a preliminary finding 
that forms the basis for more detailed investigation in this dissertation. Do these results 
hold in a multivariate framework that compares Hindus and Muslims? Furthermore, if 
Hindu parents are able to exercise a son preference and deliberately influence the sex of 
their child by undertaking prenatal sex determination and sex selective abortions, to what 
extent would postnatal gender-based discrimination still be present? Or on the other hand, 
is postnatal gender-based discrimination an additional manifestation of underlying son 
preference and daughter aversion? What role does a group’s majority/minority status play 
in influencing its son preference? These questions are addressed in the Chapters that 
follow. 
Parity Sex of Previous Children Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
1 - 1.024 (0.927-1.121) 1.041 (0.926-1.157) 1.037 (0.939-1.135) 1.05 (0.934-1.167) 1.03 (0.933-1.126) 1.033 (0.922-1.145)
2 Male 1.04 (0.894-1.186) 1.046 (0.803-1.288) 1.031 (0.886-1.175) 1.085 (0.838-1.331) 1.084 (0.932-1.235) 1.081 (0.843-1.32)
Female 1.138 (0.976-1.3) 1.028 (0.685-1.37) 1.135 (0.974-1.297) 1.092 (0.731-1.452) 1.152 (0.991-1.313) 1.1 (0.742-1.458)
3 Both Male 1.045 (0.779-1.311) 1.125 (0.743-1.508) 1.036 (0.767-1.305) 1.146 (0.751-1.54) 1.027 (0.761-1.293) 1.054 (0.699-1.409)
Both Female 1.279 (0.984-1.573) 0.893 (0.445-1.341) 1.207 (0.927-1.488) 0.953 (0.463-1.443) 1.163 (0.899-1.427) 0.893 (0.43-1.356)
One Male, One Female 1.093 (0.905-1.281) 1.027 (0.472-1.583) 1.096 (0.905-1.286) 1.167 (0.555-1.779) 1.087 (0.9-1.275) 1.15 (0.541-1.758)
4 - 1.07 (0.961-1.179) 1.134 (0.717-1.551) 1.087 (0.976-1.197) 1.023 (0.633-1.412) 1.122 (1.008-1.237) 1.079 (0.68-1.478)
All - 1.071 (1.016-1.126) 1.018 (0.834-1.203) 1.074 (1.019-1.129) 1 (0.818-1.182) 1.087 (1.031-1.142) 1.081 (0.888-1.274)
Parity Sex of Previous Children Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
1 - 1.041 (0.944-1.137) 1.008 (0.898-1.117) 1.029 (0.933-1.125) 0.996 (0.887-1.106) 1.033 (0.936-1.13) 1.014 (0.901-1.127)
2 Male 1.056 (0.907-1.205) 1.026 (0.799-1.252) 1.044 (0.893-1.195) 0.995 (0.772-1.219) 1.016 (0.868-1.163) 0.988 (0.768-1.208)
Female 1.199 (1.032-1.365) 1.142 (0.769-1.515) 1.207 (1.036-1.378) 1.048 (0.701-1.396) 1.244 (1.065-1.422) 1.02 (0.684-1.356)
3 Both Male 0.952 (0.701-1.204) 1.06 (0.706-1.415) 0.944 (0.684-1.204) 1.039 (0.691-1.386) 0.975 (0.696-1.255) 1.074 (0.718-1.43)
Both Female 1.147 (0.886-1.408) 1.016 (0.501-1.531) 1.262 (0.969-1.555) 1.074 (0.53-1.618) 1.26 (0.963-1.557) 1.168 (0.569-1.767)
One Male, One Female 1.05 (0.865-1.236) 0.992 (0.468-1.515) 1.083 (0.885-1.282) 0.966 (0.449-1.483) 1.084 (0.877-1.291) 1.026 (0.481-1.572)
4 - 1.162 (1.042-1.283) 1.081 (0.676-1.486) 1.168 (1.041-1.294) 1.121 (0.69-1.553) 1.144 (1.015-1.273) 1.055 (0.635-1.475)
All - 1.094 (1.038-1.151) 1.031 (0.846-1.217) 1.098 (1.04-1.156) 1.04 (0.849-1.231) 1.095 (1.036-1.154) 0.983 (0.798-1.168)
Parity Sex of Previous Children Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
1 - 1.046 (0.947-1.145) 1.025 (0.912-1.138) 1.046 (0.947-1.146) 1.025 (0.912-1.139) 1.058 (0.959-1.158) 1.032 (0.917-1.146)
2 Male 1.059 (0.907-1.212) 1.041 (0.811-1.272) 1.058 (0.905-1.21) 1.064 (0.831-1.298) 1.032 (0.884-1.18) 1.064 (0.831-1.296)
Female 1.19 (1.019-1.361) 1.02 (0.683-1.358) 1.21 (1.038-1.382) 1.006 (0.683-1.33) 1.193 (1.023-1.362) 1.016 (0.69-1.341)
3 Both Male 1.096 (0.768-1.424) 1.141 (0.764-1.517) 1.094 (0.769-1.419) 1.156 (0.788-1.525) 1.087 (0.755-1.42) 1.186 (0.812-1.561)
Both Female 1.305 (0.991-1.619) 1.174 (0.562-1.786) 1.221 (0.923-1.52) 1.155 (0.533-1.778) 1.286 (0.97-1.602) 1.131 (0.505-1.757)
One Male, One Female 1.158 (0.934-1.383) 1.204 (0.547-1.861) 1.165 (0.935-1.395) 1.093 (0.505-1.682) 1.142 (0.911-1.372) 1.15 (0.541-1.758)
4 - 1.108 (0.979-1.237) 0.981 (0.592-1.37) 1.106 (0.973-1.24) 0.973 (0.599-1.348) 1.108 (0.971-1.246) 0.95 (0.579-1.322)
All - 1.103 (1.043-1.164) 1.066 (0.866-1.266) 1.102 (1.042-1.163) 1.067 (0.86-1.274) 1.101 (1.04-1.162) 1.078 (0.866-1.289)
from two waves of the National Family and Health Survey, and a weight average of the two years was taken for the overlapping years, 1995-1998.
99% confidence intervals calculated using the delta method are shown in parenthesis. The cells highlighted in bold are those where the lower bound
of the confidence interval exceeds 1.02 male births per female birth.
Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-II 1998-99, and NFHS-III 2005-06.
4
Table 1: Sex-ratio at birth, conditional on sex of previous birth, by parity and religion, for births in India.
1997 1998
1999 2000
1996
Note: Sex-ratios at birth are calculated based on 3-year moving averages. The mid-point year is shown here. The number of births was obtained 
2001
2002 2003 2004
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CHAPTER 1: Hindu-Muslim Differences in Son Preference in India: An Analysis of 
Ideal Preferences and Fertility Behaviors 
	   6 
ABSTRACT 
The sex ratio at birth in India has been skewed in favor of males since at least the late-
19th century, and the trend has accelerated in recent times indicating the continuing 
prevalence of son preference. Son preference is closely linked to both fertility and 
mortality, with the expectation that a preference for male children leads to increased 
fertility and to increased female mortality. While the existence of son preference in India 
is well-known in the literature, a key gap in our understanding of the determinants of son 
preference relates to potential differences that may exist between religious groups. This 
paper examines data from two waves of the nationally-representative National Family 
and Health Survey, 1998-99 and 2005-06 to determine if and to what extent does son 
preference differ between Hindus and Muslims, the two largest religious groups in India. 
Using women’s self-reported ideal sex composition of their children and actual fertility 
behaviors, this study finds that Muslims have lower son preference compared to Hindus. 
The odds of a male birth among Hindus vary depending on parity and the sex of children 
already born but there is evidence for sex selection among Hindus during births when the 
family previously has only daughters. A religious difference in son preference remains 
strong and significant after controlling for socioeconomic determinants of son preference, 
and suggests that religious identity, beliefs and practices especially among the majority 
Hindus in India may be a key cultural explanation for the persistence of son preference.  
 
 
	   7 
INTRODUCTION 
The preference for male children and the concurrent discrimination against girls in India 
are considered to be key barriers to fertility decline, the main reasons why sex ratios at 
birth and child sex ratios in India remain inordinately higher compared to many other 
countries, as well as the explanations for the excess female mortality at all ages from 
early childhood to the reproductive years (Bhat and Zavier 2005; Jha et al 2011; Bhalotra 
et al 2010). Demographers have long recognized that the skewed population sex ratio in 
India – more males compared to females – is due to unusually high female mortality from 
age 1 to 35, compared to males, and that this results from the overall low status of women 
in society, their nutritional neglect and poor access to timely healthcare (Arokiasamy 
2004; Arnold, Kishor, and Roy, 2002; Sen 2003,1989; Basu 1989; Dyson and Moore 
1983). In contrast, most societies where access to nutrition and healthcare are unbiased, 
male mortality is higher than female mortality at every age, and sex ratios at birth in most 
countries vary between 1.02 and 1.05 males per female, with the slight skew in favor of 
males compensating for their greater mortality (Coale 1991; Guilmoto 2012).  
One striking statistic which has changed over the years is the juvenile sex ratio, or the 
number of males per female in the age group of 0-5 years, which increased from 1.029 in 
1891 to 1.078 in 2001, a rate of increase that was faster than the rate of increase in the 
overall sex ratio. Furthermore, the last three decades in particular have seen a sharp 
increase, with the latest Census of 2011 recording the juvenile sex ratio at 1.094. 
(Registrar General of India 2001, 2011). Researchers have attributed this increase to 
differential stopping behavior, continuing neglect of female children, and increases in 
female-specific abortions compounded in recent years by greater access to technologies 
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for determining the sex of the child (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Arnold, Kishore, and Roy 
2002; Bhaskar 2011; Jha et al 2011). A preference for sons lies at the root of this 
phenomenon. While the existence of son preference in India is well known, a key gap in 
our understanding of son preference pertains to the differences that may exist between 
religious groups. This paper evaluates son preference in India to examine if and to what 
extent does son preference exist and differ between Hindu and Muslim families.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The presence of a preference for sons over daughters in a number of countries of Asia 
including India is well-established in the literature (Arnold, Choe, & Roy 1998; Gupta et 
al. 2003; Clark 2000). The reason is recognized as the greater value in financial and 
material terms that sons are purported to have for parents and families in the long-run 
compared to daughters, by virtue of being more likely to live with parents even after 
marriage and by bringing in dowry at the time of marriage (Miller 1981; Das Gupta 
1984), as well as by providing greater social status to the family (Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell 1989). Traditionally sons do not set up a separate household after marriage but 
continue to live with parents, whereas daughters usually leave the parental home and live 
with the husband and his family after marriage. Thus sons constitute and continue a 
family’s lineage, whereas daughters move out of their parental homes upon marriage and 
get absorbed within their husbands’ lineage. Research indicates that this patrilineal nature 
of kinship in India is thus associated with greater value for sons, while at the same time 
`the rigidity of the kinship system in India and other countries of South- and South-East 
Asia explains the heightened son preference not found in other countries with similar 
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norms of kinship and inheritance (Das Gupta 2009).  
A preference for sons over daughters may also stem from the overall disadvantaged status 
that women are accorded in families and in society at large. Marriages in India have 
traditionally involved the payment of a dowry by the bride’s family to the groom’s, and 
the substantial costs of dowry may be a disincentive for parents to have daughters but 
according to Das Gupta et al (2003), the underlying determinant of son preference in 
India remains kinship systems, for kinship systems in south India where the female 
disadvantage in mortality and health is lower than in north India impose fewer 
restrictions on physical and material contact between married daughters and parents. The 
contrast between north and south India, broadly defined, in terms of sociocultural norms 
and the status enjoyed by women is one of the most widely studied phenomenon in the 
social sciences. Two notable features highlighted by Dyson and Moore (1983) were that 
marriages in the ‘north Indian kinship system’ are characterized by caste-, village- as well 
as clan-exogamy whereas marriages in the ‘south Indian kinship system’ can often be 
consanguineous; and second that while in north India women are unlikely to inherit 
property, it is possible for women in south India to inherit property themselves and/or be 
the medium through which property is inherited by children. The kinship system of the 
Muslim community with its acceptance of consanguineous marriages and inheritance 
laws that include daughters is arguably similar to the ‘south Indian kinship system’ (Nasir 
and Kalla 2006). One can expect that in consanguineous Muslim unions, since the bride 
and groom’s families know each other prior to marriage and married women retain strong 
links with their natal home, the status accorded to married women is greater than it would 
be in Hindu households where marriages are village- and clan-exogamous (Bloom, Wypij 
	   10 
and Das Gupta 2001; Iyer 2002). Additionally, Muslim personal law has always included 
wives and daughters as undeniable inheritors of a share in a deceased man’s wealth, 
although the share that daughters are entitled to is half that of their brothers (Mondal 
1979). In contrast, among Hindu households, daughters traditionally did not inherit 
ancestral property and even the codified personal law in the form of the Hindu 
Succession Act (1956) in India – applicable to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs since  
– did not grant daughters the right to inherit ancestral property until the law was amended 
in 2005. Most studies on son preference in India also cite that a key religious utility that 
Hindu households derive from sons relates to duties that parents expect to be performed 
on their own death (Arnold et al. 1998; Pande and Astone 2007; Bhaskar 2011). It is 
believed that a person’s soul can reach heaven only if a son and in his absence a grandson 
or another male member of the family lights the funeral pyre, and sons are also believed 
to be able to enable the souls of deceased parents to achieve salvation by performing 
various rites such as distributing alms and food to the poor and to the priests.  
These differences between Hindu and Muslim practices suggest that the two groups may 
differ in significant ways in terms of the prevalence of son preference or daughter 
aversion. However unlike the extensive literature examining religious differences in total 
fertility and contraceptive behaviors, there is a relative dearth of work on religious 
differences in son preference per se. Within the demographic literature, there has been a 
long-standing interest in understanding the influence of religion on fertility, starting most 
notably with Goldscheider (1971), who indicated that there may be multiple sources for 
fertility differences between religious groups. These may relate to differences between 
religions groups in underlying socioeconomic characteristics, the particular tenets of a 
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religious group which pass value judgments or prescribe appropriate actions on marriage, 
contraception and childbearing, as well as the effect of minority group status on a 
community’s integration in society and its impact on fertility preferences. The association 
of Islam with higher fertility has also been an area of particular interest, and various 
scholars have investigated the factors to which the higher Muslim fertility in South- and 
Southeast Asia be attributed (Obermeyer 1992; Knodel 1999; Morgan et al 2002; Bhat 
and Zavier 2005). Morgan et al (2002) study whether fertility differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in South and Southeast Asia can be attributed to differences in 
the level of women’s autonomy between communities. While they find that Muslim 
women generally desire more and have more children, and are less likely to use 
contraceptive methods, particularly sterilization, they did not find evidence for the role of 
lower autonomy explaining higher ‘pro-natalist’ attitudes and behaviors among Muslims.  
Bhat and Zavier (2005) attribute about one-fourth of the differences in total fertility 
between Hindus and Muslims in India to socioeconomic differences between the two 
groups, and contend that religious doctrines and beliefs among Muslims strongly 
influence their attitudes towards fertility in general and contraception in particular. In 
terms of son preference, women’s autonomy and son preference are expected to be 
inversely related and as a result one may expect son preference to be fairly high among 
Muslim households (Bhat and Zavier 2005). There are however only a few studies that 
have looked directly at differences between Hindus and Muslims in terms of son 
preference, whereas others have examined son preference as a determinant of child 
mortality differences between the two groups in India. In an earlier multivariate analysis 
of ideal family size in 1998-99 and the proportion of sons reported in the ideal family 
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size, Bhat and Zavier (2003) have shown that controlling for standard of living, urban and 
rural residence, work status, and number of living as well as dead children, Muslims 
show a lower level of son preference. Bhalotra, Valente, and van Soest (2010) 
hypothesize that the lower child mortality seen in India among Muslim households may 
be attributed to a lower disadvantageous status of daughters compared to those in Hindu 
households, compensating for the overall lower socioeconomic status and women’s 
empowerment in Muslim households that may increase mortality relative to Hindus, but 
do not find evidence that differences in son preference can explain the lower Muslim 
child mortality levels. Guillot and Allendorf (2010) explore the issue further and find that 
girls in Muslim families are discriminated against less than girls in Hindu families if the 
girl is the first child or when the family already has sons. On the other hand, if the family 
already has daughters, girls are discriminated against more in Muslim families than in 
Hindu families. The authors conclude that while son preference differences can be ruled 
out in the explanation of Hindu-Muslim mortality differentials, the fundamental idea that 
son preference may be lower among Muslim households needs to be understood better.  
Overall therefore, it is not clear if and to what extent does son preference vary between 
Hindus and Muslims. This is also related more fundamentally to the question of whether 
religious identity itself influences son preference. Taking the example of funeral rites, 
Dyson (2002) suggested that since male members of the family other than sons can also 
perform these rites, son preference had roots less in religion per se than in structures of 
kinship, inheritance, and marriage. It is of interest to test this hypothesis and determine 
whether religious groups differ on measures of son preference independent of state- or 
regions of residence in India as well as socioeconomic differences. The presence of 
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differences between religious groups would suggest that the fundamental roots of, and 
more importantly differences between social groups, in son preference do not subsume 
religious differences. There are also few quantitative studies that allow an independent 
examination of kinship or marriage practices which we may in turn relate to differences 
in parental sex preference for children.  
A related question is that of the extent to which broad categories such as religion do not 
account for what may be important within-group differences. The same argument could 
be made for all socioeconomic differentials along which fertility preferences and 
behaviors are analyzed. Broad classifications such as urban or rural, state- or region of 
residence, or household wealth quintiles are also used to study the mean differences 
between these groups and the relationship that these characteristics have with fertility, or 
indeed mortality and other indicators. Religion or religious identity represents a key 
grouping along which society in India is divided, but the study of Hindu-Muslim 
differences in particular remains a contentious issue because of the risk of 
misinterpretation of not just the findings but also the motivation for the research in the 
first place. In that area, academic research on the association of religion with 
demographic outcomes has helped fill key knowledge gaps as well as clear 
misconceptions, for example about the rate of growth of the Muslim population in India 
relative to other religious groups (Bhat and Zavier 2005; Kulkarni and Alagarajan 2005), 
the reasons why child mortality among Muslims in India is lower on average compared to 
Hindus (Guillot and Allendorf 2010), and that overall religion and women’s autonomy do 
not appear to be related (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001) and that differences in women’s 
autonomy does not influence fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims 
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(Morgan et al 2002).  This study of differences between Hindus and Muslims on son 
preference is an extension of the interest in understanding whether and why there are 
differences in terms of total fertility or child mortality between these groups as a whole. 
Previous studies shed some light on the reasons that son preference may differ among 
Hindus and Muslims, but they are inconclusive regarding the magnitude and direction of 
differences between them. In order to study this, I analyze two measures of son 
preference: women’s self-reported preference for the ideal number and sex composition 
of children, as well as the actual behaviors operationalized by the probability of a male 
birth. In both cases, I account for parity as well as sex composition of existing children, 
explicitly by stratifying the sample by parity in the case of ideal preference, and by 
including the number and sex of previous children as a covariate in the case of actual 
fertility behaviors.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
This study uses data from two waves of the women’s questionnaire of the Demographic 
and Health Surveys in India, called the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) 
conducted in 1998-99 and 2005-06 by the International Institute of Population Sciences, 
Mumbai. Both surveys are nationally representative and interviewed women in the age-
group of 15-49 years. NFHS-II (1998-99) interviewed a total of 89,199 ever-married 
women across all 26 states, whereas NFHS-III (2005-06) interviewed 124,385 women in 
all 29 states. The sample is limited to women who report their religion as Hindu or as 
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Muslim, for this is the key difference this study seeks to examine, and to women who 
reported being de jure residents of the household units sampled. For ideal preferences, I 
pool data from NFHS-II and NFHS-III restricting the sample from NFHS-III to ever-
married women for the purpose of uniformity with NFHS-II. The final analytical sample 
includes 157,050 women, comprising of 76,593 women in NFHS-II and 80,457 women 
in NFHS-III. All regression models control for the survey wave.  
The analysis for fertility behaviors is conducted using only the NFHS-III data, in order to 
study births in the specific time period of the five years preceding the survey. The 
analytical sample includes 42,880 births in Hindu households and 9945 births in Muslim 
households in the period 2000-2005. Births in the analysis are restricted to women who 
reported an ideal preference for at least one child. The inclusion of ideal fertility 
preference as a covariate is explained in greater detail below. 
Dependent Variable: Ideal Preference  
Women’s self-reported preference for an ideal number and sex composition of children, 
is measured in the NFHS by the question, “If you could back in time to the time you did 
not have any children and choose exactly the number of children to have in your own life, 
how many would that be?” Women who gave a numerical response to this question were 
asked a follow-up question: “How many of these children would you like to be boys, how 
many would you like to be girls and for how many would the sex not matter?” In NFHS-
II, 94.7% of Hindu and Muslim women gave a numerical response to the survey question, 
whereas the numerical response rate in NFHS-III was even higher at 97.4%. Only women 
with a numerical response are included in the final analytical sample. 
	   16 
The dependent variable related to the sex preference for children is coded as an ordinal 
categorical variable with three categories: son preference: more sons preferred to 
daughters, daughter preference: more daughters preferred to sons, and no preference. The 
third category of no preference is calculated from the number of women who reported no 
preference for sons or for daughters for their ideal number of children, combined with 
women who reported an even number of ideal children and then an equal number of sons 
and daughters. Conceptually therefore we operationalize son preference as women 
reporting that of their ideal number of children, they prefer a majority of sons. This 
approach is consistent with previous literature on desired fertility and son preference (Lin 
2009; Chung and Das Gupta 2007; Pande and Astone 2007; Bhat and Zavier 2003). The 
advantage of coding the dependent variable with three categories is that we maximize the 
information available related to women’s preference. Related to our hypothesis about 
Muslim women having lower son preference compared to Hindu women, we are able to 
ask additionally whether Muslim women would have lower son preference because they 
have greater preference for daughters or because they are more likely to be indifferent 
between sons and daughters. 
A limitation of using desired fertility as a dependent variable is that it is likely to have 
been affected by ex-post rationalization (Pritchett 1994). If women’s current actual 
family size is greater than their ideal desired level, then they may adjust the average ideal 
number of children upwards so that their existing children do not appear to be 
“undesired”. Women may also desire to have more children of a particular sex if their 
previous children of that sex have died, or on the other hand want fewer children of a 
particular sex if they associate that sex with a greater likelihood of mortality. Women in 
	   17 
larger families in general may also be inclined to go either way with their own desired 
children – perhaps associating children with additional responsibilities and demands on 
household resources or on the other hand, being more receptive to the idea of a number of 
children. In order to account for these effects, the analysis includes control variables for 
the existing number of children, number of deceased sons and daughters and the woman’s 
family size.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 1, we see the distribution of ideal parity by year as well as All-India, Hindu 
women and Muslim women. We see that the ideal total number of children, sons and 
daughters desired by women has declined between 1998-99 and 2005-06 for all groups. 
We also see that across all categories, Muslim women prefer more children compared to 
Hindu women. Table 2 below shows that the majority of Hindu and Muslim women want 
an ideal parity of 2 children in both 1998-99 and 2005-06. The proportion increases from 
about half of all Hindu women in 1998-99 to nearly two-thirds in 2005-06 and from 
about a third of Muslim women to a little over half during the same period. A striking 
difference between the two religious groups is that while about 58% Muslim women 
want fewer than three children, a much higher proportion at 77% of Hindu women want 
fewer than three children. Very small proportions of women in the survey report that they 
want no children, and these women are excluded from the analysis in this paper. 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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In Figure 1, we see the distribution of the sex preference for children by parity. At all 
ideal parities, more Hindu women prefer sons compared to Muslim women, with the 
largest difference at the ideal parity of three, which is the ideal parity for about a quarter 
of Muslim women and 16% of Hindu women in 2005-06, as seen in Table 2. At ideal 
parities of two and more, son preference becomes stark for both Hindu and Muslim 
women. Between them however, Muslim women appear to prefer more sons than Hindu 
women at an ideal parity of two and sex, but have lower levels of son preference at other 
levels. Figure 1 also reveals that the third category of fertility preference, indifference 
and equal preference, is the largest category of responses for Hindu and Muslim women 
in both 1998-99 and 2005-06 at ideal parities of one, two, and four, as well as for the 
fairly small proportion of women who reported an ideal parity of six. This indicates that 
when women want only one child, the difference between son preference and daughter 
preference is the smallest among all ideal parity levels. This confirms that the three-way 
categorization of our dependent variable is appropriate for this data. It also suggests that 
we may stratify the sample by ideal parity in order to determine the extent of differences 
between Hindu and Muslim preferences at different ideal parity levels. 
Dependent Variable: Fertility Behaviors  
Even though the ideal preference is an indicator of fertility desires, the actual fertility 
behaviors of individuals, and in particular the probability of male births, may indicate 
deliberate efforts by individuals to translate their preferences into their desired sex 
composition of children. The biological determinants of the human sex ratio at birth are 
not particularly well known. Although some research has found that the sex ratio (males 
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per female) at birth declines with an increasing number of children in multiple births or 
increasing paternal age, other factors such as maternal age, birth order, or sex of previous 
children do not appear to have an impact (Jacobsen, Moller, and Mouritsen 1999). The 
sex ratio at conception is slightly skewed in favor of males, which is balanced to some 
extent by the higher incidence of intra-uterine mortality of male fetuses (Guilmoto 2012). 
Slight variations due to conflict and environmental factors notwithstanding (Polasek 
2006), from a demographic perspective the sex of a child at birth is essentially a random 
event and in the absence of any deliberate effort to manipulate the sex of the child 
surviving to full-term, we may expect the sex ratio at birth to be about 105 male births 
per 100 female births (Clark 2000, Guilmoto 2012). The dependent variable in this study 
is thus the odds of a male birth relative to a female birth, and a finding that the odds are 
higher than about 1.05 would be evidence for prenatal sex determination and female-
specific abortions.   
Independent Variables 
Previous research has shown that the existing number of sons has a strong positive 
association with the preferred number of sons whereas the presence of a daughter 
marginally reduces the reported preference for sons (Bhat and Zavier 2003). We have 
also noted earlier that the number and sex composition of children already born may 
influence women’s responses related to their ideal parity. In order to account for 
differences due to this, I control for the number of sons and daughters ever born to the 
mother. Analysis conducted with existing children classified into two categories – 
	   20 
deceased and surviving – does not add further explanatory power to the key explanatory 
variables of interest.  
In the analysis on fertility behaviors, an important control variable is the ideal number of 
children reported by mothers. This directly addresses the issue of differential total 
fertility preferences between Hindus and Muslims. Given that the ideal number of 
children is higher for Muslims than for Hindus (as seen in Table 1), it is possible that 
latent son preference among Muslims does not manifest in prenatal sex determination. 
With a willingness to have a higher number of children, relative to Hindus, Muslim 
families may contend that they have more opportunities in total to have their desired 
number of sons. It is therefore important to control for the ideal number of children in the 
analysis on fertility behaviors.  
The analysis also controls for maternal age, employment status, total family size, 
household wealth, women’s empowerment, and media exposure. Given the possibilities 
of seasonal fluctuations in income as a result of agricultural patterns or migration, 
potentially multiple sources of income within a household, informal occupations with 
payments in kind, as well as the unreliability of reporting wages, the use of a wealth 
index as a unitary measure based on household assets is preferred over income. However, 
there are differences between the two NFHS waves in the calculation of the wealth index. 
As a result I replicate the methodology followed by NFHS-II and create for the NFHS-III 
a three-level classification of household wealth – high, medium, and low – based on 
house quality, access to sanitation, electricity, drinking water source, ownership of home, 
land and livestock, as well as consumer durable goods ranging from furniture to vehicles.  
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We noted above that previous studies have suggested that a negative relationship may 
hold for empowerment and son preference. Given that Hindu and Muslim women may 
have differential levels of household autonomy and participation in decision-making, I 
include two measures of women’s empowerment as covariates in the analysis. These 
pertain to decision-making related to seeking healthcare, and to visiting relatives. Women 
are asked who in their household usually makes decisions related to visiting a health 
facility for their own needs, and related to visiting their family or relatives. The options 
are mainly you, mainly your husband, you and your husband jointly, and someone else. It 
is conceivable that women who make these decisions on their own are more empowered 
than their counterparts who take these decisions jointly with their husband. However, for 
the purposes of simplicity, I present the analysis here with empowerment for both 
variables coded dichotomously - if the woman reported any participation in the decision-
making with the reference category being decision by the husband or someone else. The 
analysis (not shown here) with a three-level categorization of empowerment yields no 
significant difference in the results. Given the possible interaction between women’s 
household status, wealth and exposure to the media, I include media as a covariate in the 
analysis. The NFHS asks women about the frequency of their reading newspapers, 
listening to the radio and watching television, with response options being not at all, less 
than once a week, at least once a week, and almost every day. I construct a media 
exposure variable with three categories: not at all (no exposure to any of the three 
mediums), low exposure (less than everyday reading of newspapers or listening to the 
radio, or watching television less than once a week), and high exposure (daily reading of 
newspapers or listening to the radio, or once a week or daily watching of television).  
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Methods 
Ideal Preference: Since the dependent variable is coded as a categorical variable with 3 
categories, son preference, daughter preference and no preference, I use multinomial 
logistic regression comparing women with son preference, and women with daughter 
preference to the reference category of women with no preference. This specification will 
allow us to determine not only if Hindu and Muslim women differ in terms of son 
preference but also allow us to fully utilize the variance in sex preference of children by 
comparing son and daughter preference to the large category of women reporting no or 
equal preference at ideal parities of one, two, and four children. 
With J categories in the dependent variable (j=1, 2… J), the model is specified as 
log !!"
!!"
= 𝛽!|!𝑥! ,  
where 𝜋!" is the probability that individual i falls into category j, 𝜋!" is the probability 
that individual i falls into the reference category J, and 𝑥! is the vector for explanatory 
variables for individual i.  
The advantages of estimating the multinomial logistic model with multiple unordered 
categories over a series of binary logistic regression models comparing son preference to 
equal/no preference and daughter preference to equal/no preference are that the former 
allows us to perform a global test of the null hypothesis that religion has no effect on the 
	   23 
sex preference for children, as well as test for differences in the coefficients across the 
two comparisons.  
Fertility Behaviors: The differential odds of a male birth rather than a female birth are 
calculated using a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is 
dichotomized as a male birth relative to a female birth among all women who gave birth 
in the five years preceding NFHS-III, i.e. during 2000-2005. The model is designed to 
yield parity-specific odds of a male birth depending on the sex composition of previous 
children. Thus, the explanatory variables in the model are the number and sex 
composition of children previously born. The reference category is first births, i.e. where 
there are no previous children. Compared to first births, the odds of a male birth are 
calculated for second-order births where the first child was male and first child was 
female; third order births where the first two children were both male, both female, or 
one male and one female; and all fourth or higher order births. As explained earlier, odds 
of a male birth higher than 1.05 relative to a female birth would indicate that the sex ratio 
of births in that category is greater than the biological norm of 1.05 male births for every 
female birth and therefore present evidence for female-specific abortions at that level. 
The analysis is conducted separately for Hindus and Muslims and presents results at the 
same level of parity and with the same sex composition of previous children. 
Both sets of analysis employ state-fixed effects so that only within-state variation in 
fertility preferences is analyzed as well as to account for unobserved state-level clustering 
of fertility preferences. The analysis of fertility behaviors also accounts for clustering at 
the level of the NFHS primary sampling unit, assuming that all residents of a 
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neighborhood have the same access to facilities for prenatal sex determination and 
female-specific abortion. Educational and wealth differentials that may determine access 
to these facilities are already employed as controls in the models. 
 
RESULTS 
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The distribution of the independent variables in the pooled sample of NFHS-II and 
NFHS-III is shown in Table 3. Hindu women comprise about 86% of the total sample. 
We see that in terms of schooling, wealth and media exposure, Hindu women are more 
likely to be in the highest categories compared to Muslim women. In terms of schooling, 
Muslim women less likely to have completed higher (Grades 12+) levels at about 3.5%, 
compared to 7% among Hindu women. About 40% of all Hindu women are currently 
employed in a non-household job, whereas a much smaller proportion of Muslim women, 
about 22% are employed. In terms of household wealth, more Muslim women are in the 
lower third, and fewer in the richest category compared to their Hindu counterparts. 
37.5% Muslim women have no exposure to newspapers, radio or the television, 
compared to 33% Hindu women. We see however that in terms of empowerment, Hindu 
and Muslim women are nearly similar. Hindu women are marginally more likely to be 
able to decide – either on their own or with their husbands – when to visit their family 
and relatives, but the better position in higher schooling, employment status and wealth 
does not appear to translate into commensurate greater household empowerment.  
 
	   25 
Ideal Preference: Results of the multinomial logistic regression models are shown in 
Tables 4-9. Figure 2 shows the odds of son preference among Muslim women compared 
to Hindu women from the final models across all ideal parities. 
 [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
We see that our models confirm the hypothesis that Muslims express lower levels of son 
preference than Hindus when asked about the ideal number and sex composition of 
children. The effects are statistically significant for our full sample not stratified by ideal 
parity, as well as ideal parities of 2-4, which represents about 90% of the total sample. 
We next discuss some of the main highlights of the separate models. 
 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents the results of the overall specification, where the sample is not stratified 
by ideal parity. I control for age, family size, number of sons and daughters ever born, the 
ideal parity, as well as the NFHS wave in all models. Figures shown are conditional odds 
ratios and 95% confidence intervals. Our baseline model, Model 1, suggests that Muslim 
women compared to Hindu women are 27% less likely to prefer a majority of sons to 
having no preference or preferring an equal number of sons and daughters, conditional on 
their not preferring a majority of daughters. This result remains robust across the models, 
and even after the inclusion of schooling, wealth, media exposure and empowerment 
covariates in Model 3, we see a lower son preference among Muslim women compared to 
Hindu women. In the final model, Model 4, the inclusion of state-fixed effects lowers the 
magnitude of difference but it remains statistically significant, and indicates that Muslim 
women are 15% less likely than Hindu women to prefer a majority of sons. When we 
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examine the other covariates in the model, we see a strong negative educational gradient 
in son preference, with women who have completed higher education (Grades 12+) being 
54% less likely than women with no education to prefer a majority of sons. Interestingly, 
employed women appear to have marginally higher son preference by 4% compared to 
unemployed women. We have evidence therefore in Model 1 that Muslim women do 
indeed have lower levels of son preference compared to Hindu women. We should also 
note that there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups in terms 
of a daughter preference. Next, we examine the results stratified by ideal parity. 
 [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 shows the results for 10,268 women at ideal parity of one. Women with an ideal 
parity of one child are still a special case in India, as our descriptive statistics in Table 2 
have shown. We see that the gross higher levels of son preference among Muslims at an 
ideal parity of one that we have seen in Figure 1, hold in Model 3 even after controlling 
for education, area of residence, household wealth, media and empowerment. In Model 3, 
Muslim women at an ideal parity of one are 22% more likely to prefer a majority of sons. 
However, our state-fixed effects models in Model 4 eliminate this difference. Muslim 
women continue to have 40% higher odds of preferring more daughters relative to Hindu 
women.  The highest proportion of both Muslim and Hindu women is concentrated at the 
ideal parity of two. Our baseline model in Table 6 suggests significantly lower levels of 
son preference among Muslims compared to Hindus, with Muslim women 32% less 
likely to prefer a majority of sons. We see in Models 2-4 that while household wealth is 
not associated with son preference, relative to the poorest third, the middle-class and 
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upper 30% of women are less likely to prefer daughters relative to having no preference. 
This is indeed interesting, for it suggests not that there is a daughter aversion and a son 
preference, but a strong likelihood for women in wealthier families to prefer one son and 
one daughter. On the contrary, more educated women have significantly lower odds of 
son preference and higher odds of a daughter preference. In our final model, Muslim 
women are 20% less likely to prefer a majority of sons compared to Hindu women. The 
religious difference results are replicated at ideal parities of three, four and five, except in 
the final state-fixed effects model at the ideal parity of five. 
 [TABLE 6-9 ABOUT HERE] 
Our results, except at an ideal parity of one, suggest the absence of a wealth gradient in 
son preference. The inclusion of education, media exposure and empowerment covariates 
in the model lower the absence of son preference among Muslim women but the effect 
remains strong and statistically significant. Our baseline models as well as subsequent 
models therefore suggest fundamentally that differences between Hindu and Muslim 
women are not related to differences in these socioeconomic characteristics between the 
two groups. Both media exposure and women’s empowerment appear to affect women’s 
ideal preferences in favor of an equal/no preference, but not in terms of actual fertility 
behaviors.  
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Fertility Behaviors: The results of the logistic regression models showing the 
differential odds of a male birth are shown in Table 10. We see that compared to first 
births, there is a significantly higher likelihood of a male birth compared to a female birth 
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in Hindu households – about 11% higher odds in case of second-order births when the 
first born is a girl, and 18% higher odds in case of third-order births when both previous 
children are girls. These differences are not seen in the case of Muslims. The step-wise 
logistic regression models in Table 10 show that in addition to religion, the only 
background characteristic that has a statistically significant relationship with whether the 
child was male is household wealth. One would expect that in the absence of any 
deliberate intervention to influence the sex of the child, socioeconomic characteristics 
hold no relationship with whether the child was male or female. However we see in 
Model 3 that compared to Hindu women in the poorest household wealth quintile, Hindu 
women in the top two wealth quintiles are more likely to have had a male child in the five 
years preceding the survey. When state-fixed effects are introduced in Model 4, the 
richest wealth quintile loses significance, but Hindu women in the “richer” category 
remain more likely than the poorest women to have had male children, indicating that 
access to services for sex-selective abortions is determined to some extent by the ability 
to afford them. These results do not hold for Muslims, for whom no socioeconomic or 
background characteristic is associated with the sex of the child at birth. Indeed the odds 
of a male birth compared to a female birth are not statistically significant at any level of 
parity or sex composition of previous children for Muslims. In case of Hindus, these 
results clearly indicate that fertility behaviors vary depending on parity and the sex of 
children already born and show a preference for at least one son when the family has only 
daughters. Given the odds significantly skewed in the direction of male births, well above 
1.05 that we may expect as the biological odds of a male birth, these results provide 
evidence of female-specific abortions among Hindus.   
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[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 11, I present results of the fertility behavior multivariate analysis after stratifying 
the sample into the Dyson & Moore (1983) classification of states into the north-Indian 
kinship system and south-Indian kinship systems. The north-Indian sample excludes 
Punjab while the south-Indian sample excludes Goa, because Muslims are neither the 
largest nor the second-largest religious group in either of these two states. This analysis 
serves the purpose of determining whether the effect of religious identity on prenatal sex 
determination that we are seeing in the results still hold within each of the two distinct 
kinship systems that characterize north- and south India. If Hindus in south India were 
likely to be influenced by the prevalent “less rigid construction of gender in the kinship 
systems” (Das Gupta et al 2003) to the extent that it affected their son preference, we 
would expect to find no evidence for sex selection for both Hindus and Muslims in south 
India. And to the extent that the preferences of Muslims residing in the states of north 
India may be influenced by the prevalent north-Indian kinship system with village- and 
clan-exogamy as well as a rigid patrilineal framework, we may expect to see indicators of 
son preference, not seen earlier at the all-India level. The results presented in Table 11 
show once again the odds of male births among all births in five years preceding the 
NFHS-III survey. The explanatory variables of interest relate the number and sex of 
children previously born in the family. We see that the odds of male births are not 
significantly different from 0 for Muslims in neither the north or the south of India. In the 
southern India, the direction of the coefficients is towards higher odds of a male birth in 
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Muslim families but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Among Hindus, the 
results differ slightly from the all-India data seen earlier. In southern India, the odds of a 
male birth for second-order births where the first-born is a girl are no longer greater than 
significantly different from 0. However in case of third-order births where both previous 
children are girls, the odds of a male birth are 51% higher than in the case of first-order 
birth. The comparable all-India statistic was 18% higher odds of a male birth. In northern 
India, again the odds of a male birth are higher for in case of second-order births when 
the first child is a girl. This analysis is just a simple measure of checking whether the 
fertility behaviors of Hindus and Muslims differ between northern and southern India. A 
limitation of any analysis of the effect of kinship systems on son preference, as noted 
earlier, is the absence of individual-level data on the social norms to which individuals 
subscribe.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The starting point of this study was that their marriage and inheritance practices 
suggested that there was likely to be less ‘daughter aversion’ among Muslims compared o 
Hindus. The literature reviewed suggested strongly that differences in the patrilineal 
systems of kinship, and marriage customs in particular, lower son preference among 
Muslims, relative to Hindus. Overall, the results presented in this paper indicate that 
compared to Hindus, Muslim women report no preference or preference for an equal 
number of sons and daughters in terms of ideal preferences, whereas births in Muslim 
households are no more likely to be male than female. On the other hand, Hindus in India 
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do express a son preference in terms of their ideal fertility preferences, and which is also 
revealed in their actual fertility behaviors.  
The results presented here suggest that the fundamental features of kinship systems that 
influence son preference or daughter aversion are distinct among Hindus and Muslims in 
India. Among Muslims in particular, the greater tolerance for having daughters indicates 
that the perceived value of daughters is not so low compared to sons that Muslims 
attempt to deliberately influence the sex of their child when they have only daughters. 
The features of a Muslim kinship system where consanguineous marriages are common 
and inheritance laws among Muslims less discriminatory against daughters do appear to 
be influencing their fertility preferences as well. The contrast between Hindus and 
Muslims in India is also stark with strong evidence for female-specific abortions among 
Hindus when their existing children are only girls.  
The results of this paper also suggest that the typology of north- and south-Indian kinship 
systems and particularly the relationship between kinship and son preference or daughter 
aversion does not account for variation between and within religious groups. Dyson and 
Moore (1983) themselves acknowledged that the kinship systems they described were not 
expected to be homogenous within a region or indeed across all social strata. To that end 
this paper is able to demonstrate one aspect of the heterogeneity related to son preference. 
As far as Muslims are concerned, the absence of son preference or the presence of lower 
daughter aversion appears to be true in the north as well as south India. Muslims in north 
India are no more likely than Muslims in the south to express son preference in terms of 
their ideal desires or actual fertility behaviors. In south India, Hindus are less likely than 
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their north-Indian counterparts to undertake sex-selective abortions at parity of two even 
when the first child is a girl. However, when the first two children are girls, Hindus show 
a strong preference for sons. This confirms that there are differences between the north 
and south India among Hindus, but that son preference is prevalent for Hindus in both 
regions. This is not surprising, since the typology of different kinship systems at the 
regional level is not expected to apply perfectly to individual-level behaviors. Individual 
preferences as measured in this paper indicate clearly that Hindus report a preference for 
a majority of sons, relative to an equal number of sons and daughters or reporting no 
preference between the two. They are also willing to act on their preference, which the 
results here indicate having at least one son if the only existing children are girls.  
By conducting parity-specific analysis as well as accounting for the total ideal number of 
children when analyzing actual fertility behaviors, the analysis compares Hindus and 
Muslims at the same level of parity and accounts for the key difference that the ideal 
fertility preference is higher on average for Muslims than Hindus. The comparison of the 
two measures also gives credence to the ideal fertility preference measure used in surveys 
such as the DHS worldwide. The results of the two measures are consistent in our 
findings: the differences between Hindus and Muslims in terms of their ideal preference 
are reflected in their actual fertility behaviors.  
The results of this study have significant policy implications. This study of religion as a 
key cultural explanation for the persistence of son preference may be a means of 
understanding the limitations that development programs may have in addressing strong, 
latent fertility preferences. Policies on the issue of son preference have focused on gender 
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equity information campaigns and laws banning prenatal sex determination and sex-
selective abortions. Indeed, broader generalizations in previous research as well related to 
the role of education, wealth and media overlook the fact, as our results have indicated, 
that son preference has deeper roots embedded in religious practices and beliefs. 
Marriage in particular remains a strong social event, universal and nearly always 
characterized by a strong participation from senior and extended family members in 
related rituals. To the extent that women’s household status, participation in decision-
making, and reduced economic dependency has the potential to alter female-
discriminating practices during marriage, we may expect that daughter-aversion may 
decline. Muslim women may benefit to a lower extent from higher education, household 
wealth and media exposure relative to Hindus, and yet based on the community’s norms 
and customs appear to be following more gender equal practices from practices that do 
not discriminate against daughters. 
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Table 1: Ideal Number of Children Desired by Women aged 15-49 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06 
    
             
 
All Children Sons Daughters 
 
1998-99 2005-06 1998-99 2005-06 1998-99 2005-06 
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
All-India 2.67 1.09 2.30 0.96 1.38 0.88 1.03 0.78 0.99 0.66 0.85 0.64 
Hindu 2.57 0.97 2.17 0.81 1.34 0.83 0.97 0.73 0.94 0.60 0.78 0.57 
Muslim 3.04 1.31 2.58 1.05 1.54 1.06 1.18 0.86 1.10 0.74 0.94 0.67 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-II, 1998-99 and NFHS-III, 2005-06.	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Table 2: Percentage distribution of Ideal Parity for Hindu and Muslim  
Women in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06 
     
 
1998-99 2005-06 
Ideal Parity Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim 
0 0.10 0.08 0.84 1.20 
1 5.43 2.37 8.82 3.08 
2 52.58 38.69 63.06 46.39 
3 26.53 29.36 19.30 27.80 
4 12.15 20.25 6.74 16.89 
5 2.08 4.81 0.82 2.98 
6 0.79 2.64 0.29 1.09 
6+ 0.33 1.79 0.13 0.57 
     Non-numeric Response 4.5% 11.3% 2.2% 4.8% 
Analytical Sample 
67,034  9,559   68,608   11,849  
76,593 80,457 
157,050 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
  
   
        
  
  Hindu Muslim 
   
Average SD Average SD 
  
          
Demographic Characteristics         
Age 
 
  31.1 8.8 30.2 8.5 
Schooling 
 
          
   None 
 
  50.1 % 54.4 % 
   Some Primary   16.0 % 17.8 % 
   Some Secondary   26.9 % 24.3 % 
   Higher 
 
  7 % 3.5 % 
Employed 
 
  39.7 % 21.9 % 
   
        
Household Characteristics         
Household Size 
 
6.2 3.3 7.2 3.8 
Household Wealth 
 
        
   Lower 
 
  32.8 % 35.0 % 
   Middle 
 
  40.2 % 41.4 % 
   Higher 
 
  22.4 % 18.6 % 
Residence 
 
          
   Rural 
 
  72.9 % 63.2 % 
   Urban 
 
  27.1 % 36.7 % 
   
        
Media Exposure 
 
        
   None 
  
33.2 % 37.5 % 
   Low 
  
15.1 % 17.1 % 
   High 
  
51.7 % 45.4 % 
   
        
Women's Empowerment         
   Health-Related 
 
54.3 % 54.9 % 
   Mobility 
  
52.5 % 48.5 % 
   
        
Fertility History           
   Sons Ever Born   1.45 1.25 1.71 1.49 
   Daughters Ever Born   1.34 1.33 1.59 1.51 
 	    
135,642 21,408 
	  	   	  	   N 157,050 
	  
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 0.73*** (0.70 - 0.76) 1.07 (0.97 - 1.17) 0.76*** (0.74 - 0.79) 1.07 (0.97 - 1.18) 0.76*** (0.73 - 0.79) 1.07 (0.97 - 1.18) 0.85*** (0.82 - 0.88) 0.93 (0.84 - 1.03)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 0.77*** (0.75 - 0.80) 1.10 (0.99 - 1.23) 0.82*** (0.79 - 0.85) 1.09 (0.98 - 1.22) 0.90*** (0.87 - 0.94) 1.00 (0.90 - 1.12)
   Some Secondary 0.56*** (0.54 - 0.58) 1.38*** (1.25 - 1.52) 0.61*** (0.59 - 0.63) 1.36*** (1.23 - 1.50) 0.67*** (0.65 - 0.70) 1.21*** (1.09 - 1.34)
   Higher 0.42*** (0.40 - 0.46) 2.16*** (1.87 - 2.49) 0.47*** (0.44 - 0.50) 2.11*** (1.82 - 2.44) 0.46*** (0.43 - 0.49) 1.91*** (1.64 - 2.21)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.78*** (0.76 - 0.80) 1.13** (1.04 - 1.22) 0.84*** (0.82 - 0.87) 1.11* (1.02 - 1.20) 0.84*** (0.82 - 0.87) 1.17*** (1.07 - 1.27)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.90*** (0.88 - 0.93) 1.18*** (1.10 - 1.27) 0.90*** (0.88 - 0.93) 1.18*** (1.09 - 1.27) 1.04* (1.01 - 1.06) 1.13** (1.04 - 1.22)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 0.98 (0.92 - 1.05) 0.89 (0.75 - 1.06) 0.99 (0.93 - 1.05) 0.89 (0.75 - 1.05) 1.02 (0.96 - 1.08) 0.86 (0.73 - 1.02)
   Upper 30% 0.95 (0.89 - 1.01) 0.88 (0.74 - 1.05) 1.00 (0.93 - 1.06) 0.87 (0.73 - 1.04) 0.94 (0.88 - 1.00) 0.91 (0.76 - 1.08)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None)
   Low 0.95** (0.92 - 0.99) 0.95 (0.85 - 1.06) 1.01 (0.97 - 1.05) 0.90 (0.80 - 1.01)
   High 0.74*** (0.72 - 0.77) 1.05 (0.95 - 1.16) 0.91*** (0.88 - 0.94) 0.96 (0.87 - 1.07)
Empowerment (Ref.=None)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.96** (0.93 - 0.98) 0.99 (0.91 - 1.07) 0.94*** (0.92 - 0.97) 1.01 (0.93 - 1.09)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family 0.93*** (0.91 - 0.96) 1.07 (0.99 - 1.16) 0.97* (0.94 - 1.00) 1.06 (0.98 - 1.16)
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.84*** (0.82 - 0.86) 1.05 (0.98 - 1.13) 0.85*** (0.83 - 0.87) 1.05 (0.98 - 1.13) 0.87*** (0.85 - 0.89) 1.05 (0.97 - 1.12) 0.79*** (0.77 - 0.81) 1.06 (0.98 - 1.14)
Total observations: 157,050.
Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-II 1998-99, and NFHS-III 2005-06
Note: OR=Odds Ratio. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for maternal age, family size, ideal parity, and sons and daughters ever born.
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Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Model 2
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 1.35** (1.13 - 1.62) 1.38* (1.03 - 1.85) 1.25* (1.04 - 1.51) 1.44* (1.07 - 1.94) 1.22* (1.01 - 1.47) 1.45* (1.08 - 1.95) 1.11 (0.91 - 1.35) 1.40* (1.04 - 1.89)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 1.15 (0.99 - 1.33) 1.83*** (1.39 - 2.43) 1.32*** (1.13 - 1.54) 1.81*** (1.36 - 2.41) 1.35*** (1.15 - 1.59) 1.72*** (1.29 - 2.29)
   Some Secondary 0.72*** (0.63 - 0.82) 1.64*** (1.29 - 2.10) 0.89 (0.77 - 1.02) 1.61*** (1.24 - 2.08) 0.9 (0.77 - 1.04) 1.50** (1.16 - 1.95)
   Higher 0.58*** (0.50 - 0.69) 2.03*** (1.54 - 2.68) 0.75** (0.63 - 0.89) 1.99*** (1.49 - 2.66) 0.73*** (0.61 - 0.87) 1.92*** (1.44 - 2.58)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.67*** (0.60 - 0.73) 0.97 (0.82 - 1.13) 0.72*** (0.65 - 0.80) 0.97 (0.83 - 1.15) 0.72*** (0.65 - 0.80) 0.98 (0.83 - 1.16)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.93 (0.84 - 1.02) 1.10 (0.94 - 1.30) 0.94 (0.85 - 1.03) 1.10 (0.94 - 1.29) 1.07 (0.96 - 1.19) 1.15 (0.97 - 1.35)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 1.35** (1.10 - 1.66) 1.25 (0.90 - 1.74) 1.28* (1.04 - 1.57) 1.25 (0.90 - 1.73) 1.31* (1.07 - 1.62) 1.18 (0.84 - 1.64)
   Upper 30% 1.32** (1.07 - 1.62) 1.24 (0.89 - 1.71) 1.32** (1.07 - 1.62) 1.24 (0.89 - 1.72) 1.25* (1.01 - 1.54) 1.28 (0.92 - 1.78)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None) 0.76** (0.64 - 0.91) 1.22 (0.86 - 1.73) 0.83* (0.69 - 0.99) 1.18 (0.83 - 1.67)
   Low 0.55*** (0.48 - 0.64) 1.09 (0.81 - 1.48) 0.66*** (0.56 - 0.77) 1.06 (0.78 - 1.44)
   High
Empowerment (Ref.=None) 0.83*** (0.75 - 0.92) 0.82* (0.69 - 0.97) 0.79*** (0.71 - 0.88) 0.82* (0.69 - 0.97)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.84*** (0.75 - 0.93) 1.15 (0.97 - 1.37) 0.83*** (0.75 - 0.93) 1.14 (0.96 - 1.36)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.89** (0.81 - 0.97) 1.03 (0.89 - 1.19) 0.91 (0.83 - 1.00) 1.05 (0.90 - 1.23) 0.94 (0.86 - 1.04) 1.06 (0.91 - 1.24) 0.84*** (0.76 - 0.93) 1.09 (0.93 - 1.27)
Total observations: 10,268.
Note: OR=Odds Ratio. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for maternal age, family size, and sons and daughters ever born.
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Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children at Ideal Parity of 1 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 0.68*** (0.60 - 0.76) 1.53** (1.12 - 2.09) 0.71*** (0.63 - 0.80) 1.60** (1.17 - 2.20) 0.70*** (0.62 - 0.79) 1.65** (1.20 - 2.27) 0.80*** (0.71 - 0.91) 1.56** (1.13 - 2.15)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 0.71*** (0.65 - 0.77) 1.29 (0.88 - 1.88) 0.78*** (0.71 - 0.85) 1.15 (0.78 - 1.69) 0.83*** (0.76 - 0.91) 1.08 (0.74 - 1.59)
   Some Secondary 0.54*** (0.50 - 0.59) 2.30*** (1.68 - 3.14) 0.63*** (0.58 - 0.69) 1.93*** (1.39 - 2.66) 0.66*** (0.61 - 0.73) 1.78*** (1.27 - 2.48)
   Higher 0.40*** (0.34 - 0.48) 3.97*** (2.67 - 5.91) 0.47*** (0.40 - 0.56) 3.26*** (2.16 - 4.90) 0.49*** (0.41 - 0.58) 3.39*** (2.23 - 5.15)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.69*** (0.64 - 0.75) 1.45** (1.14 - 1.84) 0.76*** (0.70 - 0.82) 1.30* (1.02 - 1.65) 0.72*** (0.66 - 0.78) 1.37* (1.08 - 1.75)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.07* (1.00 - 1.14) 1.27* (1.00 - 1.60) 1.06 (0.99 - 1.13) 1.27* (1.01 - 1.61) 1.08* (1.01 - 1.16) 1.14 (0.90 - 1.45)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 1.06 (0.90 - 1.25) 0.53** (0.35 - 0.81) 1.08 (0.91 - 1.27) 0.53** (0.35 - 0.81) 1.11 (0.94 - 1.31) 0.47*** (0.31 - 0.72)
   Upper 30% 1.13 (0.96 - 1.35) 0.53** (0.35 - 0.81) 1.21* (1.02 - 1.43) 0.50** (0.33 - 0.77) 1.05 (0.88 - 1.25) 0.54** (0.35 - 0.82)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None) 0.73*** (0.66 - 0.80) 1.07 (0.65 - 1.75) 0.81*** (0.73 - 0.89) 1.01 (0.61 - 1.65)
   Low 0.64*** (0.59 - 0.69) 1.93** (1.30 - 2.87) 0.75*** (0.69 - 0.81) 1.49* (1.00 - 2.22)
   High
Empowerment (Ref.=None) 0.97 (0.91 - 1.05) 0.83 (0.65 - 1.08) 0.97 (0.90 - 1.04) 0.84 (0.65 - 1.09)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.90** (0.84 - 0.97) 1.29 (0.99 - 1.67) 0.87*** (0.81 - 0.94) 1.18 (0.90 - 1.54)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.71*** (0.66 - 0.75) 1.47*** (1.17 - 1.85) 0.71*** (0.67 - 0.76) 1.41** (1.11 - 1.78) 0.74*** (0.70 - 0.79) 1.34* (1.06 - 1.71) 0.71*** (0.66 - 0.75) 1.49** (1.17 - 1.89)
Total observations: 87,704.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios.  *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for maternal age, family size, and sons and daughters ever born.
39
Son Preference (Ref.=Equal/No 
Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children at Ideal Parity of 2 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Model 2
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 0.45*** (0.41 - 0.49) 0.68*** (0.58 - 0.78) 0.48*** (0.44 - 0.52) 0.69*** (0.59 - 0.80) 0.47*** (0.44 - 0.51) 0.69*** (0.59 - 0.80) 0.62*** (0.57 - 0.69) 0.63*** (0.53 - 0.74)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 0.69*** (0.63 - 0.75) 0.91 (0.78 - 1.07) 0.76*** (0.69 - 0.83) 0.97 (0.82 - 1.14) 0.85** (0.77 - 0.94) 0.92 (0.78 - 1.09)
   Some Secondary 0.60*** (0.55 - 0.66) 1.18* (1.01 - 1.38) 0.70*** (0.64 - 0.77) 1.28** (1.09 - 1.51) 0.89* (0.80 - 0.99) 1.27** (1.07 - 1.51)
   Higher 0.50*** (0.40 - 0.62) 1.15 (0.82 - 1.62) 0.60*** (0.48 - 0.74) 1.26 (0.89 - 1.78) 0.65*** (0.51 - 0.82) 1.32 (0.93 - 1.89)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.73*** (0.67 - 0.79) 0.94 (0.81 - 1.08) 0.83*** (0.76 - 0.90) 0.98 (0.84 - 1.13) 0.78*** (0.71 - 0.85) 0.98 (0.84 - 1.14)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.78*** (0.72 - 0.84) 1.04 (0.92 - 1.17) 0.78*** (0.72 - 0.84) 1.03 (0.91 - 1.17) 0.98 (0.90 - 1.06) 1.02 (0.90 - 1.17)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 0.84* (0.70 - 1.00) 0.91 (0.67 - 1.24) 0.84 (0.71 - 1.01) 0.92 (0.68 - 1.25) 0.88 (0.73 - 1.06) 0.93 (0.68 - 1.27)
   Upper 30% 0.86 (0.71 - 1.04) 1.05 (0.76 - 1.45) 0.93 (0.77 - 1.12) 1.07 (0.78 - 1.49) 0.84 (0.69 - 1.03) 1.08 (0.78 - 1.49)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None) 0.77*** (0.70 - 0.85) 0.73*** (0.61 - 0.87) 0.88* (0.79 - 0.97) 0.74** (0.62 - 0.89)
   Low 0.62*** (0.57 - 0.68) 0.78** (0.67 - 0.91) 0.83*** (0.76 - 0.91) 0.81** (0.69 - 0.95)
   High
Empowerment (Ref.=None) 0.85*** (0.78 - 0.91) 0.98 (0.85 - 1.12) 0.86*** (0.80 - 0.94) 1.03 (0.90 - 1.18)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.86*** (0.79 - 0.93) 0.9 (0.79 - 1.03) 0.91* (0.84 - 0.99) 0.89 (0.78 - 1.02)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.83*** (0.78 - 0.89) 1.00 (0.89 - 1.12) 0.81*** (0.76 - 0.87) 0.98 (0.87 - 1.10) 0.86*** (0.80 - 0.92) 1.02 (0.90 - 1.15) 0.73*** (0.68 - 0.79) 1.02 (0.90 - 1.15)
Total Observations: 37,100.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for maternal age, family size, and sons and daughters ever born.
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Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children at Ideal Parity of 3 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No 
Model 2
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 0.72*** (0.65 - 0.79) 0.75 (0.44 - 1.26) 0.74*** (0.67 - 0.82) 0.65 (0.37 - 1.11) 0.74*** (0.66 - 0.82) 0.64 (0.37 - 1.11) 0.87* (0.78 - 0.97) 0.57 (0.31 - 1.05)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 0.78*** (0.68 - 0.90) 1.06 (0.55 - 2.06) 0.83** (0.72 - 0.96) 0.94 (0.48 - 1.85) 0.94 (0.82 - 1.09) 0.85 (0.43 - 1.69)
   Some Secondary 0.76** (0.65 - 0.90) 2.82*** (1.63 - 4.88) 0.82* (0.69 - 0.98) 2.45** (1.39 - 4.33) 0.95 (0.79 - 1.13) 2.40** (1.31 - 4.42)
   Higher 0.7 (0.38 - 1.29) 1.52 (0.22 - 10.3) 0.77 (0.41 - 1.42) 1.29 (0.19 - 8.73) 0.83 (0.44 - 1.56) 1.33 (0.19 - 9.11)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.86* (0.76 - 0.97) 1.36 (0.81 - 2.27) 0.95 (0.84 - 1.08) 1.17 (0.68 - 1.99) 0.95 (0.83 - 1.09) 1.19 (0.69 - 2.06)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.88** (0.80 - 0.95) 1.38 (0.90 - 2.10) 0.87** (0.80 - 0.95) 1.39 (0.91 - 2.12) 0.99 (0.91 - 1.09) 1.14 (0.72 - 1.79)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 0.85 (0.67 - 1.09) 2.68 (0.41 - 17.6) 0.86 (0.68 - 1.10) 2.74 (0.42 - 18.0) 0.82 (0.64 - 1.04) 2.72 (0.41 - 18.0)
   Upper 30% 0.81 (0.62 - 1.06) 2.73 (0.39 - 18.9) 0.88 (0.67 - 1.16) 2.44 (0.35 - 17.0) 0.79 (0.60 - 1.04) 2.43 (0.35 - 17.0)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None) 0.89 (0.79 - 1.00) 1.13 (0.61 - 2.09) 0.97 (0.86 - 1.09) 1.07 (0.57 - 2.01)
   Low 0.73*** (0.65 - 0.82) 1.67 (0.99 - 2.83) 0.88* (0.78 - 1.00) 1.52 (0.88 - 2.62)
   High
Empowerment (Ref.=None) 1.09 (0.99 - 1.20) 1.59 (1.00 - 2.53) 1.07 (0.97 - 1.17) 1.66* (1.04 - 2.64)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.85*** (0.78 - 0.94) 0.77 (0.49 - 1.22) 0.88** (0.80 - 0.96) 0.74 (0.47 - 1.17)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.69*** (0.64 - 0.75) 1 (0.56 - 1.27) 0.69*** (0.63 - 0.75) 1 (0.57 - 1.30) 0.71*** (0.65 - 0.78) 0.81 (0.53 - 1.24) 0.67*** (0.61 - 0.73) 0.79 (0.51 - 1.21)
Total observations:16,693.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All Models control for age, family size, and sons and daughters ever born.
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Table 8: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children at Ideal Parity of 4 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No 
Model 2
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Muslim (Ref.=Hindu) 0.49*** (0.38 - 0.64) 0.53*** (0.37 - 0.75) 0.54*** (0.40 - 0.71) 0.52*** (0.35 - 0.75) 0.52*** (0.39 - 0.69) 0.51*** (0.35 - 0.75) 0.75 (0.53 - 1.07) 0.76 (0.49 - 1.20)
Schooling (Ref.=None)
   Some Primary 0.42*** (0.29 - 0.60) 0.83 (0.52 - 1.33) 0.46*** (0.32 - 0.67) 0.87 (0.54 - 1.40) 0.93 (0.60 - 1.44) 1.45 (0.85 - 2.49)
   Some Secondary 0.35*** (0.23 - 0.55) 1.01 (0.58 - 1.77) 0.43*** (0.27 - 0.69) 1.08 (0.61 - 1.93) 1.15 (0.65 - 2.03) 2.11* (1.07 - 4.14)
   Higher 0.69 (0.16 - 3.04) 2.61 (0.48 - 14.3) 0.81 (0.18 - 3.64) 2.76 (0.50 - 15.1) 1.52 (0.31 - 7.60) 4.00 (0.70 - 23.0)
Area of Residence (Ref.=Rural)
   Urban 0.93 (0.64 - 1.36) 1.25 (0.77 - 2.01) 1.16 (0.78 - 1.73) 1.34 (0.81 - 2.20) 1.17 (0.76 - 1.79) 1.20 (0.70 - 2.06)
Employed (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.72* (0.55 - 0.96) 0.99 (0.69 - 1.41) 0.72* (0.54 - 0.95) 0.99 (0.69 - 1.41) 0.90 (0.66 - 1.23) 0.99 (0.67 - 1.46)
Household Wealth (Ref.=Bottom 30%)
   Middle 30% 1.12 (0.50 - 2.49) 0.71 (0.28 - 1.83) 1.22 (0.54 - 2.73) 0.71 (0.27 - 1.84) 1.51 (0.65 - 3.50) 0.83 (0.31 - 2.22)
   Upper 30% 0.92 (0.39 - 2.18) 0.45 (0.16 - 1.29) 1.1 (0.46 - 2.64) 0.48 (0.17 - 1.38) 1.26 (0.51 - 3.12) 0.51 (0.17 - 1.53)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None) 0.79 (0.54 - 1.14) 0.95 (0.59 - 1.53) 0.89 (0.60 - 1.33) 1.10 (0.67 - 1.81)
   Low 0.54*** (0.38 - 0.76) 0.79 (0.51 - 1.25) 0.70 (0.48 - 1.01) 0.92 (0.57 - 1.48)
   High
Empowerment (Ref.=None) 0.93 (0.69 - 1.26) 0.93 (0.64 - 1.36) 0.91 (0.67 - 1.26) 0.97 (0.65 - 1.44)
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 0.8 (0.59 - 1.08) 1.15 (0.79 - 1.68) 0.83 (0.60 - 1.13) 1.16 (0.78 - 1.71)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family
Survey Wave (Ref.=NFHS-II)
   NFHS-III 0.77* (0.60 - 1.00) 0.97 (0.70 - 1.35) 0.79 (0.61 - 1.03) 0.96 (0.69 - 1.36) 0.89 (0.68 - 1.17) 0.97 (0.69 - 1.38) 0.86 (0.64 - 1.16) 0.85 (0.59 - 1.23)
Total observations: 2,770.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for age, family size, and sons and daughters ever born.
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Table 9: Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Women's Ideal Sex Preference for Children at Ideal Parity of 5 in India, 1998-99 and 2005-06
Model 1 (Baseline) Model 3 Model 4 (State-fixed Effects)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Son Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No Preference)
Daughter Preference 
(Ref.=Equal/No 
Model 2
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Children Previously Born (Ref. = None)
  One, Boy 0.94 (0.87 - 1.01) 0.94 (0.79 - 1.11) 0.93 (0.87 - 1.00) 0.96 (0.80 - 1.13) 0.93 (0.87 - 1.00) 0.95 (0.80 - 1.13) 0.93* (0.86 - 1.00) 0.95 (0.80 - 1.13)
  One, Girl 1.11** (1.04 - 1.20) 1.04 (0.89 - 1.23) 1.11** (1.03 - 1.19) 1.07 (0.90 - 1.26) 1.11** (1.03 - 1.20) 1.07 (0.90 - 1.26) 1.11** (1.03 - 1.19) 1.07 (0.91 - 1.26)
  Two, both boys 0.97 (0.84 - 1.12) 1.19 (0.93 - 1.52) 0.97 (0.84 - 1.13) 1.24 (0.95 - 1.60) 0.98 (0.84 - 1.13) 1.24 (0.95 - 1.60) 0.97 (0.84 - 1.13) 1.24 (0.96 - 1.62)
  Two, both girls 1.19** (1.06 - 1.32) 0.96 (0.73 - 1.26) 1.19** (1.06 - 1.33) 0.99 (0.76 - 1.31) 1.19** (1.06 - 1.33) 0.99 (0.76 - 1.31) 1.18** (1.06 - 1.33) 1.00 (0.76 - 1.32)
  Two, one boy and one girl 1.06 (0.97 - 1.16) 0.87 (0.71 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.96 - 1.17) 0.90 (0.74 - 1.10) 1.07 (0.97 - 1.18) 0.90 (0.74 - 1.10) 1.06 (0.96 - 1.17) 0.91 (0.74 - 1.11)
  Three or more 1.06* (1.00 - 1.13) 0.96 (0.85 - 1.09) 1.07 (0.99 - 1.16) 1.04 (0.88 - 1.23) 1.08 (1.00 - 1.18) 1.04 (0.88 - 1.23) 1.08 (0.99 - 1.17) 1.05 (0.89 - 1.24)
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.03 (0.98 - 1.09) 0.95 (0.84 - 1.07) 0.99 (0.94 - 1.05) 0.95 (0.84 - 1.07) 1.00 (0.94 - 1.06) 0.96 (0.83 - 1.10)
Maternal Education (Ref.=None)
   Primary 1.01 (0.94 - 1.09) 1.11 (0.96 - 1.29) 1.00 (0.93 - 1.08) 1.12 (0.96 - 1.29) 1.01 (0.94 - 1.09) 1.12 (0.96 - 1.31)
   Secondary 1.01 (0.95 - 1.08) 1.06 (0.92 - 1.22) 0.99 (0.92 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.93 - 1.22) 1.00 (0.93 - 1.07) 1.08 (0.93 - 1.25)
   Higher 1.02 (0.90 - 1.16) 1.13 (0.80 - 1.60) 0.98 (0.86 - 1.12) 1.11 (0.77 - 1.61) 0.99 (0.87 - 1.13) 1.12 (0.77 - 1.64)
Maternal Employment (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.02 (0.98 - 1.06) 0.99 (0.91 - 1.08) 1.02 (0.99 - 1.06) 1.00 (0.91 - 1.09) 1.02 (0.99 - 1.06) 1.00 (0.91 - 1.09)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None)
   Low 1.03 (0.96 - 1.10) 0.92 (0.80 - 1.07) 1.03 (0.96 - 1.10) 0.92 (0.79 - 1.06) 1.03 (0.96 - 1.10) 0.91 (0.79 - 1.05)
   High 1.06 (1.00 - 1.13) 1.02 (0.89 - 1.18) 1.04 (0.97 - 1.11) 1.01 (0.88 - 1.17) 1.04 (0.97 - 1.11) 1.01 (0.87 - 1.17)
Empowerment
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 1.00 (0.95 - 1.05) 0.97 (0.86 - 1.08) 1.00 (0.95 - 1.05) 0.97 (0.86 - 1.09) 1.00 (0.95 - 1.05) 0.97 (0.87 - 1.09)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family 1.00 (0.95 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.95 - 1.19) 1.00 (0.95 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.95 - 1.19) 1.00 (0.95 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.95 - 1.19)
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%)
   Lower 1.04 (0.97 - 1.11) 1.01 (0.86 - 1.18) 1.03 (0.96 - 1.10) 1.01 (0.86 - 1.18)
   Middle 20% 1.05 (0.97 - 1.13) 1.10 (0.94 - 1.29) 1.03 (0.95 - 1.11) 1.09 (0.93 - 1.29)
   Richer 1.14** (1.04 - 1.25) 0.99 (0.82 - 1.20) 1.11* (1.00 - 1.22) 0.98 (0.80 - 1.20)
   Richest 20% 1.17** (1.04 - 1.30) 1.07 (0.83 - 1.37) 1.11 (0.99 - 1.25) 1.05 (0.81 - 1.37)
State-fixed Effects
Observations
Source: National Family and Health Survey, 2005-06.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All Models control for maternal age, husband's educational attainment, total family size, and clustering at the level of the survey primary sampling unit.
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Table 10: Odds of a Male Birth Among All Births in Hindu and Muslim Households in India, 2001-05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Children Previously Born (Ref. = None)
  One, Boy 0.87* (0.77 - 0.97) 0.95 (0.73 - 1.25) 0.96 (0.83 - 1.10) 1.09 (0.78 - 1.53)
  One, Girl 1.21** (1.08 - 1.36) 1.04 (0.80 - 1.36) 1.11 (0.96 - 1.27) 1.37 (0.98 - 1.91)
  Two, both boys 0.86 (0.70 - 1.05) 1.05 (0.72 - 1.53) 1.12 (0.84 - 1.49) 1.51 (0.92 - 2.46)
  Two, both girls 1.08 (0.91 - 1.27) 1.05 (0.67 - 1.64) 1.51*** (1.19 - 1.91) 1.64 (0.89 - 3.00)
  Two, one boy and one girl 1.14 (0.99 - 1.30) 0.96 (0.72 - 1.29) 1.08 (0.87 - 1.34) 1.28 (0.85 - 1.93)
  Three or more 1.11 (0.98 - 1.25) 0.98 (0.76 - 1.26) 1.26* (1.02 - 1.55) 0.93 (0.62 - 1.39)
Area of Residence (Ref. = Rural)
  Urban 0.97 (0.88 - 1.07) 0.94 (0.76 - 1.17) 0.97 (0.87 - 1.08) 0.98 (0.78 - 1.22)
Maternal Education (Ref. = None)
  Primary 0.99 (0.89 - 1.09) 1.11 (0.86 - 1.42) 0.94 (0.80 - 1.10) 1.25 (0.76 - 2.03)
  Secondary 1.03 (0.94 - 1.13) 1.09 (0.87 - 1.37) 0.88 (0.76 - 1.01) 1.04 (0.73 - 1.48)
  Higher 1.00 (0.83 - 1.22) 0.69 (0.39 - 1.22) 0.87 (0.68 - 1.12) 1.57 (0.89 - 2.79)
Maternal Employment (Ref. = Unemployed) 1.03 (0.97 - 1.09) 0.97 (0.89 - 1.06) 1.02 (0.93 - 1.11) 0.98 (0.73 - 1.31)
Media Exposure (Ref.=None)
   Low 1.11* (1.01 - 1.21) 0.92 (0.75 - 1.14) 0.94 (0.77 - 1.15) 0.77 (0.49 - 1.21)
   High 1.04 (0.95 - 1.15) 0.94 (0.76 - 1.16) 1.11 (0.95 - 1.30) 0.86 (0.59 - 1.24)
Empowerment
   Decision-maker for Health Visits 1.01 (0.94 - 1.08) 1.00 (0.84 - 1.18) 0.93 (0.83 - 1.05) 0.93 (0.70 - 1.24)
   Decision-maker for Visits to Family 1.03 (0.95 - 1.11) 1.06 (0.90 - 1.25) 1.09 (0.97 - 1.22) 0.98 (0.74 - 1.28)
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%)
   Lower 1.04 (0.94 - 1.14) 1.04 (0.77 - 1.40) 1.05 (0.89 - 1.25) 1.11 (0.44 - 2.83)
   Middle 20% 1.07 (0.96 - 1.19) 1.23 (0.93 - 1.61) 1.03 (0.87 - 1.23) 1.18 (0.61 - 2.30)
   Richer 1.08 (0.95 - 1.23) 1.09 (0.81 - 1.46) 1.25* (1.02 - 1.53) 1.08 (0.54 - 2.16)
   Richest 20% 1.13 (0.96 - 1.33) 1.18 (0.78 - 1.78) 1.18 (0.94 - 1.47) 0.96 (0.47 - 1.94)
Ideal Number of Children 0.93** (0.89 - 0.97) 0.99 (0.92 - 1.06) 0.91* (0.84 - 1.00) 0.97 (0.89 - 1.06)
Number of Births
Source: National Family and Health Survey 2005-06.
Note: OR= Odds Ratios. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05.
All models control for maternal age, husband's educational level, total family size, and clustering at the level of the survey primary sampling unit.
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Results of the Odds of a Male Birth among all Births in Hindu and Muslim Households in India, 2001-05
18,110 4,221 9,429 2,046
North India South India
Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
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Figure 1: Sex Preference for Ideal No. of Children reported by Women aged 15-49 in 
India, 1998-99 and 2005-06. 
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Figure 2: Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Son 
Preference for Muslim Women Compared to Hindu Women in India,  
1998-99 and 2005-06 
 
Note: Figures Indicate Conditional Odds Ratios. Reference Category: Hindu Women 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-II 1998-99, and NFHS-III 2005-06 
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CHAPTER 2: Sex Differentials in Child Health Outcomes in India: A Comparison 
of Hindus and Muslims 
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ABSTRACT 
Son preference or daughter aversion can manifest in the form of discriminatory behaviors 
against female children in terms of food, nutrition, and healthcare utilization. In this 
paper, I use data from the third round of the National Family and Health Survey, 2005-06 
in India to examine sex differentials in height-for-age and immunization to determine if 
and to what extent a female disadvantage is present, and importantly different. The 
hypothesis is that Muslim female children are less likely to be disadvantaged within their 
households because there is fundamentally lower daughter aversion among Muslims 
owing to more gender-equitable of marriage, inheritance, and kinship systems .The 
analysis in this paper shows that comparing children at the same parity and with the same 
sex composition of previous children, there is no female disadvantage in children’s 
immunization either for Hindus or Muslims, suggesting that parents are as likely to 
actively seek out immunization or receive publicly provided services in their homes for 
their daughters as for their sons. On the other hand, Hindu girls are worse off compared 
to Hindu boys in terms of nutrition, whereas the prevalence of stunting among Muslims 
girls is not statistically different from Muslim boys. Overall, Muslim children are worse 
off in terms of stunting compared to their Hindu counterparts, but sex differentials and 
therefore evidence for female discrimination exist only among Hindus. This supports the 
hypothesis that there is significantly lower daughter aversion among Muslims compared 
to Hindus.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most widely known features of Indian demography is that female child 
mortality is on average far in excess of male child mortality (Arokiasamy 2004; Guillot 
2002; Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Basu 1989). Excess female child mortality is reflected 
in skewed sex ratios of children aged 0-5, with trends suggesting an increasing 
‘masculinization’ from 102 boys per 100 females in 1961, 103.9 boys per 100 girls in 
1981, 107.2 in 2001 and 109.4 in 2011 (Registrar General of India 2001, 2011). While 
excess female mortality certainly indicates the presence of gender-based discrimination, 
it is also important to understand discrimination in terms of health outcomes, as markers 
of possible pathways for excess female child mortality, cumulative health disadvantages 
and shaping health outcomes over the life course (Bosch, Baqui, and van Ginneken 2008; 
Lynch and Smith 2005; Pande 2003; Kundu and Sahu 1991). An underlying preference 
for sons or aversion to daughters may lead to differential attitudes towards male and 
female children translating into differential behaviors related to their care and well-being, 
and consequently sex differentials in child health and nutrition outcomes. The literature 
on the relationship between religion and child health outcomes in India is focused largely 
on child mortality differentials between Hindus and Muslims but does not find 
differences between the two groups in terms of son preference as an explanatory factor 
for the child mortality advantage seen among Muslims. In this paper, I examine sex 
differentials in height-for-age and immunization, as two distinct outcomes of nutrition 
and healthcare utilization to determine if and to what extent a female disadvantage is 
present, and importantly different for Hindus and Muslims in India. The literature on son 
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preference in India suggests that son preference or daughter aversion may be lower 
among Muslims compared to Hindus since women are generally accorded a higher status 
in Muslim households compared to Hindu households due to the practice of 
consanguineous marriages, strong and continuing links between married women and their 
natal homes, and inheritance laws that include all daughters, (Nasir and Kalla 2006; Iyer 
2002; Bloom, Wypij, and Das Gupta 2001; Mondal 1979). To the extent that this 
translates into lower son preference and daughter aversion relative to Hindus, one expects 
that sex differentials in children’s health and nutritional outcomes will be lower 
compared to Hindus or absent altogether. The analysis in this paper shows that comparing 
children at the same parity and with the same sex composition of previous children, there 
is no female disadvantage in children’s immunization either for Hindus or Muslims, 
suggesting that parents are as likely to actively seek out immunization or receive publicly 
provided services in their homes for their daughters as for their sons. On the other hand, 
Hindu girls are worse off compared to Hindu boys in terms of nutrition, whereas the 
prevalence of stunting among Muslims girls is not statistically different from Muslim 
boys. Overall, Muslim children are worse off in terms of stunting compared to their 
Hindu counterparts, but sex differentials and therefore evidence for female discrimination 
exist only among Hindus. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Sex differentials in child health have been studied using a range of different indicators of 
child care, food and nutrition, healthcare utilization, and mortality. Through these 
measures, scholars examine the care that children receive in the course of their normal 
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growth and development and the expectation is that in the absence of a deliberate effort 
to discriminate against daughters, there would be no female-male differences in these 
measures. Child mortality data in India indicates that girls are worse off compared to 
boys in terms of under-5 mortality, driven largely by the significantly greater female 
postneonatal morality (the probability of death after the first month of life and before the 
first birthday) and female child mortality (4q1, or the probability of death between the first 
and fifth birthdays) (IIPS and Macro International 2007). In contrast, the evidence for sex 
differentials in child health outcomes such as immunization and nutrition is more mixed. 
On the one hand, some studies have indicated that sex differentials in nutrition are small 
or absent (Griffiths, Matthews, and Hinde 2002; Marcoux 2002; Hariss 1995; Basu 1993; 
Brahman, Sastry, and Rao 1988). On the other hand, various studies have indicated that 
sons are more likely to be vaccinated (Borooah 2004), breastfed for longer (Jayachandran 
and Kuziemko 2011), and that parents are more likely to avail healthcare for common 
illnesses for boys than for girls (Ganatra and Hirve 1994; Basu 1989; Caldwell, Reddy 
and Caldwell 1983) and in particular incur significantly less expenditure on girls 
compared to boys (Das Gupta 1987). Das Gupta (1987) explored the pathways for excess 
female child mortality in rural Punjab and found that although boys and girls were similar 
in caloric consumptions, boys were given more milk and fats whereas girls were given 
more cereal, and attributed mortality differentials to sex differentials in healthcare 
utilization rather than nutrition. A number of studies acknowledge that discrimination 
against girls in terms of health and nutrition and sex differentials in mortality may be a 
function of underlying son preference (Jayachandran and Pande 2013; Jayachandran and 
Kuziemko 2011; Mishra, Roy, and Retherford 2004; Arnold, Choe, and Roy 1998). 
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Overall, there is strong evidence in the literature that sex differentials in health and 
nutritional outcomes depend on the number and sex of previous children, an approach 
that this paper also takes. Mishra, Roy, and Retherford (2004) studied sex differentials in 
feeding, healthcare utilization and nutrition using the Indian DHS data of 1992-93 and 
1998-99 and found that at the parity of 3 in a combined sample of the two surveys, girls 
were more likely to be stunted if there were only other girls in the family, and boys were 
more likely to be stunted if there were only other boys. Boys were more likely to be fully 
treated for respiratory infections when first-born, or second-born if they were the first 
male child, and more likely to be immunized at parity of 3 again as the first male child in 
the family.  
 
Vikram, Vanneman and Desai (2012) find that girls of age one year and older are 10% 
less likely to be fully immunized even after accounting for maternal education, 
employment and other sociodemographic characteristics, but that this difference does not 
appear with sampling cluster-fixed effects models. Pande (2003) finds that parity as well 
as the sex composition of older siblings are key explanatory factors for childhood 
immunization and nutritional status in rural India. On the one hand, girls with two or 
more older brothers are not discriminated against – they are less likely to be severely 
stunted and equally likely to be immunized compared to boys with two or more older 
brothers, a finding the author attributes to parental desire for a balanced sex composition. 
However, girls with only older sisters are significantly worse off than boys with only 
older sisters – with girls with one sister 36% less likely to be fully immunized, and those 
with two sisters 42% less likely to be immunized and 61% more likely to be severely 
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stunted. Interestingly, the author found evidence for some neglect within boys as well - 
boys with two or more older brothers are less likely to be immunized as well as more 
likely to be severely stunted compared to boys with no brothers and compared to boys 
with older sisters. In a study of immunization rates in India over the 1992-2006 period, 
Singh (2013) found that the female disadvantage in immunization was declining over 
time but that the northeast, west, and south of India where sex differentials were low at 
the outset saw an increasing female disadvantage over time. 
 
In terms of trying to understand whether religious identity has a role in behaviors of son 
preference, some studies have focused on a comparison of sex differentials in child 
mortality among religious groups in India has been the focus of various studies whereas 
only a few have focused on sex differentials in child health and nutritional outcomes 
among different religious groups in India (Deolalikar 2010; Bhalotra et al 2010; Pande 
2003). The primary motivation for the study of child mortality differentials between 
Hindus and Muslims has been the finding that Muslims in India have lower levels of 
child mortality compared to Hindus. This result is paradoxical since social class variables 
such as education and income, which are negatively associated with mortality, are 
generally found be lower among Muslims in India than among Hindus. The possible 
explanations for this Muslim mortality advantage include the relatively greater urban 
patterns of residence for Muslims and therefore better access to piped drinking water 
within the residence and sanitation, and even among rural residents a greater probability 
of living in homes with toilets and improved water sources, as well as the greater 
likelihood for Muslim women to work from home or not work at all (Guillot and 
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Allendorf 2010). Other explanations that have been put forth include closer kinship ties, 
social networks as well as healthier behaviors among Muslims (Bhalotra et al 2010).  
 
Bhat and Zavier (2005) and Bhalotra et al (2010) also examine whether lower levels of 
son preference among Muslims can explain their lower child mortality compared to 
Hindus but do not find conclusive evidence for this. Guillot and Allendorf (2010) 
undertake a much more detailed study of the son preference hypothesis but find that sex 
differentials in morality are relatively similar among Hindus and Muslims, and son 
preference does not fully explain the Muslim child mortality advantage in India. The 
authors however do find that discrimination against girls is lower among Muslims than 
among Hindus whenever the family already has boys or in the case of first births. But on 
the other hand, there is greater discrimination against girls among Muslims whenever the 
family’s older children are only girls.  
 
These studies suggest that there are important Hindu-Muslim differences in India that in 
turn are associated with a significant difference in demographic outcomes between the 
two groups. The fact that Hindu-Muslim differentials in child mortality cannot be 
attributed to son preference does not however indicate that the two groups may be similar 
in terms of sex differentials in health and nutritional measures as well. At the aggregate 
level in India, Muslims are worse off than most other groups in terms of children under 
the age of five being stunted and underweight. Comparing Muslims with Hindus 
disaggregated into forward/higher castes and scheduled castes, Deolalikar (2010) shows 
from the NFHS-III data that among all social groups, Muslims suffer from the highest 
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rates of stunting and the second-highest rates of underweight children below the age of 5 
years. Pande (2003) also found that children in Muslim households were 39% less likely 
compared to those in Hindu households to be fully immunized and 13% more likely to be 
severely stunted. In contrast to child mortality, these findings related to child health 
outcomes are more in line with what might expect Muslims with overall poorer 
socioeconomic status to have. But the question still remains whether this overall 
disadvantage that Muslims have extends to a greater female disadvantage among 
Muslims as well. I compare Hindu and Muslim boys and girls in India on two measures – 
height-for-age as a measure of nutrition and immunization as a measure of healthcare 
utilization. The importance of these two measures is described in detail below. By 
accounting for parity and the sex composition of previous children in the family, I seek to 
determine whether and what extent are there differences between Hindus and Muslim in 
underlying son preference or daughter aversion. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
The data for this analysis comes from the third wave of the National Family and Health 
Surveys (NFHS-III) in India, conducted in 2005-06. NFHS-III has a nationally 
representative sample of 124,385 women aged 15-49, and includes height measurements 
of 44,777 children born in the five years preceding the survey. Since the focus of this 
study is a comparison of Hindu and Muslim children, the final sample for this study is 
limited to the 35,355 children born in either Hindu or Muslim households. The sample for 
analysis on immunization is further limited to 28,880 children aged 1-4 years.  
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Dependent Variables: Height-for-Age 
 
Height-for-age is an indicator of cumulative nutritional intake and is affected over a 
period of time by nutrition as well chronic ailments and is not affected in the short-term 
(WHO Multicentre Growth Reference Study Group 2006; Deaton and Dreze 2008). 
Nutritional deprivation in childhood, manifest in terms of low height-for-age or stunting, 
is associated over the life cycle with adverse health, cognition and schooling outcomes, 
shorter adult height, decreased productivity in manual labor, and in the case of females, 
with a greater likelihood of lower birthweight among their children (Victora et al 2008). 
The dependent variable for height-for-age is operationalized as a dichotomous variable 
for stunting, which takes the value of 1 for children whose height-for-age is less than 2 
standard deviations below the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards. The WHO 
Child Growth standards describe how healthy children should grow in optimal 
circumstances and are based on the WHO Multicentre Growth Reference Study of 
breastfed infants and appropriately fed children of different ethnic origins raised in 
healthy environments. Their mothers did not smoke, and the children were nourished 
with recommended feeding practices (exclusive breastfeeding for the first 6 months and 
appropriate complementary feeding from 6 to 23 months) and measured in a standardized 
way. The Multicenter Growth Reference Study was undertaken between 1997 and 2003 
to generate growth curves for assessing the growth and development of infants and young 
children around the world. It collected primary growth data and related information from 
approximately 8500 children from widely diverse ethnic backgrounds and cultural 
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settings (Brazil, Ghana, India, Norway, Oman and the USA). According to WHO, these 
standards can be used anywhere in the world since the study also showed that children 
across the world grow in similar patterns when their nutrition, health, and care needs are 
met (WHO, 2005). 
 
Dependent Variable: Childhood Immunization 
 
Childhood immunization is an important indicator of childhood health as a marker of 
healthcare utilization. Children are expected to receive their vaccines at four specific 
times in the first year:  at birth, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months of age. Unlike in the 
case of treatment of common childhood illnesses, there are no home-based substitutes for 
vaccines from health service providers. Immunization thus relates to multiple interactions 
during the first year of every child’s life with a healthcare provider – during home visits 
by health workers, health camps as part of immunization campaigns, or visits to public or 
private clinics, and is a preventative rather than curative intervention. Our operational 
definition of immunization of children is measured as a dichotomous variable which 
takes the value of 1 for children who had completed all four key immunizations: Bacilli 
Calmette-Guerin (BCG) for tuberculosis, measles, and three doses each of diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus and polio. The sample is restricted to children aged 12 months and over 
because it is expected that the immunization schedule would be completed by 12 months 
of age. 
 
Given the dichotomous coding of the dependent variables, I estimate logistic regression 
models, separately for Hindu and Muslims children. After estimating models for all 
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children in the data, I analyze sub-samples based on parity. For children at parity of 2, the 
coefficient of interest relates to Female Child * Previous Born: Female, and for children 
at parity of 3, to Female Child * Previous Born: Two Females. Standard errors are 
clustered by the survey primary sampling unit, the equivalent of a village in rural areas 
and a census enumeration block in urban areas. All analysis is conducted using a 
national-level weight provided by the NFHS-III to account for difference in sampling 
proportions across different states, probability of selection and interview non-response.  
 
RESULTS 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the sample. We note that a higher 
proportion of Hindu children in the sample compared to Muslim children are at the parity 
of one or two, indicating overall the desire for higher fertility among Muslims. About a 
third of all Hindu children in the sample are first-born, and another one-third at the parity 
of two, while the comparable proportions for Muslim children is one-fourth at parity of 
one, and another one-fourth at parity of two.  On the other hand, about a third of the 
Muslim children in the sample are at parity of 4 and greater, whereas the comparable 
proportion for Hindu children is a fifth. It is possible that by virtue of a higher total 
fertility desire, son preference among Muslims may not manifest in daughters being 
discriminated at lower parities since they expect to have further chances to achieve their 
desired number of sons. Thus while future anticipated fertility can impact parental 
behaviors towards their children, we would still be able to see to what extent child health 
outcomes vary by parity and the sex composition of previous children.  
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 presents the bivariate distribution of stunting among children. We see that overall 
both males and females in Muslim households are more likely than their Hindu 
counterparts to be stunted. Among Muslims, girls are marginally less likely to be stunted 
than boys whereas this difference does not exist among Hindus. For girls, across all 
parities among both Hindus and Muslims, the incidence of stunting is the lowest when 
they are first-born, although in absolute terms the proportion is very high indeed at over 
one-third. We note in particular that for second-born girls born after another girl, and 
third-born girls born after two girls, the incidence of stunting is higher than their male 
second- and third-born counterparts, and that this difference is significant for Hindus 
only. Interestingly, at parity of three for Hindus, the lowest relative incidence of stunting 
for girls is when they are born after two boys, and the difference with their male 
counterpart is also marginally significant. 
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 3, we see the results of the multivariate analysis of stunting. Table 3 presents the 
main coefficients of interest, and the full models are presented in Appendix Table 1. We 
see that in the case of Hindus as well as Muslims, the odds of stunting are no different for 
females relative to males for children at all parities aggregated and at parities of 1 or 4+. 
However, at parity of 2, girls born when the previous child was also female have 
significantly higher odds of being stunted compared to girls born when the previous child 
was male, and at parity of 3 when both previous children were female compared to 
females when the two previous children were male and female. These differences do not 
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exist for Muslims. The odds of stunting are marginally significant at 1.13 (the product of 
the odds of female and female*previous born was female) for girls at parity of 2, and 1.43 
(the product of the odds of female and female*previous children were both female). 
These results are presented visually in Figure 1. In Table 4, the predicted probabilities of 
stunting are presented, based on the multivariate analysis.  
 
Appendix Table 1 which shows the full models of the multivariate results by parity help 
understand which other socioeconomic and background characteristics are associated 
with stunting for all children overall, and the extent to which they differ for Hindus and 
Muslims. Most importantly, we note that the odds of stunting inversely associated with 
household wealth for both Hindu and Muslim children. For the total sample of children, 
there is a negative relationship between maternal education and children’s stunting only 
for Hindu households at all levels of maternal education. For Muslim households on the 
other hand, children of only the highest educated (that is grade 12 or above) mothers are 
less likely to be stunted compared to mothers with no formal education.  We also see that 
older children among both Hindus and Muslims and Hindu children in urban areas are 
more likely to be stunted. The core subject of study in this paper however is sex 
differentials and we return to that in looking at a second indicator, namely immunization. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The percentage distribution of full immunization among Hindu and Muslim children aged 
1-4 is presented in Table 5. We must note that overall for both Hindus and Muslims, the 
percentage of children who are fully immunized is about 50% of below. That, nearly half 
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of all Hindu children and about 60% of all Muslim children have not been immunized 
according to the guidelines of the national immunization program. Similar to the bivariate 
statistics for stunting, Muslim children are worse off compared to their Hindu 
counterparts overall. However, statistically significant male-female differentials are not 
seen for Muslim children at any level of parity. We should note that statistical 
significance is less easily reached among Muslims because of their relatively smaller 
sample especially when stratified by parity. The data for Hindu children shows otherwise. 
Girls are less likely to be fully immunized compared to boys at nearly all levels of parity, 
and for all children in the sample a 2-percentage point difference exists between girls and 
boys. A female disadvantage is especially significant when girls are second-born after an 
existing girl, and when they are third-born after two existing girls. These relationships are 
further tested in a multivariate framework below. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The main coefficients from the multivariate logistic regression models analyzing 
immunization of all children aged 1-4 are presented in Table 6. The results are only 
marginally significant at the p < 0.1 level, but the direction of the coefficients suggest a 
disadvantage for girls in Hindu households at all parities aggregated, if they are first-
born, and at parity of 2 when they are born after another girl. These differences do not 
exist for Muslim children. Overall, in contrast to the strong sex differentials seen for 
Hindus in the bivariate data, the multivariate results do not show a statistically significant 
female disadvantage. Appendix Table 2 reveals that similar to the results for stunting, the 
full models of immunization for children at different parities show that maternal 
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education and household wealth are strong determinants of the full immunization status 
of children.  
 [TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
DISCUSSION 
Overall we have evidence of daughter discrimination in Hindu families but not in Muslim 
families. The results shows that comparing children at the same parity and with the same 
sex composition of previous children, Hindu girls are worse off compared to boys, 
whereas Muslims girls are not. These patterns indicate differential attitudes towards male 
and female children, which translate into significant nutritional disadvantages for girls in 
Hindu households. Fundamentally, these results support the hypothesis that Muslim 
families are not averse to more daughters and less likely to discriminate against daughters 
in terms of nutrition and healthcare. The finding that the evidence for gender 
discrimination in nutrition is conditional on the sex composition of previous children is 
consistent with previous research (Jayachandran and Pande, 2013; Mishra, Roy, and 
Retherford, 2004). The result that there are no statistically significant sex differentials in 
full immunization poses an interesting contrast. Immunization is not a cumulative 
outcome or one that is influenced primarily by intra-household access to food and 
nutrition, and relates instead to a finite number of distinct and low- or free-of-cost 
interactions with health services. To that end, girls in Hindu households are not 
discriminated against and are as likely as boys to complete the full immunization 
schedule. 
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A key question is whether we can attribute the absence of sex differentials among 
Muslims to a lower daughter aversion, or whether there are other factors that make girls 
in Muslim households uniquely positioned to avoid being discriminated against. In their 
study of child morality differentials between Hindus and Muslims, Guillot and Allendorf 
(2010) posited that women’s employment was part of the explanation for why child 
mortality was lower among Muslims. Muslim women are more likely to work from home 
or not work at all, and this may in turn prevent potential daughter neglect from other 
caregivers. However, this would not explain why Muslim children are on average worse 
off compared to children in Hindu households. Also this analysis already controls for 
women’s employment and socioeconomic and background characteristics such as urban 
residence, parental education, and household wealth.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that these results pertain to sex differentials in post-
birth discrimination. To the extent that son preference or daughter aversion influence the 
decisions of couples to undergo prentatal sex determination and consequently even 
female-specific abortions, the results here underestimate the extent of son preference 
among Hindus. The fact that there is a female disadvantage in nutrition suggests that even 
when girls have already been born, they remain vulnerable to discriminatory practices 
related to the allocation of food, management of illnesses and timely monitoring of their 
health and nutritional status.  
 
The predicted probabilities of stunting based on the multivariate analysis show that all 
third-parity children are more likely to be stunted compared to first- and second-parity 
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children. Thus, higher parity is associated with a higher likelihood of stunting, indicating 
that household budgetary constraints may come into play when families are faced with a 
higher number of children. This would certainly explain why third- or higher parity 
children are more likely to be stunted overall, but not why girls are more vulnerable to 
stunting compared to boys. Among Hindus, when the family only has other daughters, 
girls are significantly worse off compared to boys born when the family only has other 
daughters. One explanation for this is that families who have not yet attained their desired 
number of sons reduce their investments in daughters with the realization that attaining at 
least one son would mean expanding the family even further and therefore greater 
expenditures in the future. This also points to a key difference between Hindus and 
Muslims overall that pertains to the desired family size. Muslims on average in India 
report a higher ideal number of children than Hindus, and it is conceivable that Muslims, 
unlike Hindus, expect to have more opportunities to attain their desired number of sons 
and as a result are less inclined to discriminate against daughters already born.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on son preference in India and in particular 
explains a key aspect of religion-based differentials in son preference or daughter 
aversion. This analysis confirms that there is lower daughter aversion among Muslims, 
which various studies have suggested stems from the higher value accorded to daughters 
based on consanguineous marriage, and more gender-equitable inheritance and overall 
kinship systems among Muslims compared to Hindus.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory and Control Variables 
          
  
Hindus Muslims 
    
Mean / 
% SD Min. Max. 
Mean / 
% SD Min. Max. 
Birth Order, and Sex Composition of Previous Children 
   
  
   First 
 
33.4 % 
 
  25.3 % 
 
  
   Second, after Male 14.9 % 
 
  12.4 % 
 
  
   Second, after Female 15.0 % 
 
  12.4 % 
 
  
   Third, after Two Males 3.3 % 
 
  4.1 % 
 
  
   Third, after Two Females 5.2 % 
 
  4.5 % 
 
  
   Third, after Mixed 7.9 % 
 
  8.2 % 
 
  
   Four and More 20.3 % 
 
  33.2 % 
 
  
Background Characteristics 
  
  
   
  
Age 
 
2.05 1.4 0 4 2.06 1.4 0 4 
Maternal Education 
   
  
   
  
   None 
 
40.0 % 
 
  50.9 % 
 
  
   Some Primary 14.1 % 
 
  14.4 % 
 
  
   Some Secondary 37.3 % 
 
  31.5 % 
 
  
   Higher 
 
8.6 % 
 
  3.2 % 
 
  
Paternal Education 
   
  
   
  
   None 
 
22.4 % 
 
  35.3 % 
 
  
   Some Primary 14.0 % 
 
  17.6 % 
 
  
   Some Secondary 49.9 % 
 
  40.5 % 
 
  
   Higher 
 
13.7 % 
 
  6.6 % 
 
  
Employed Mothers  36.8 % 
 
  22.4 % 
 
  
Household Characteristics 
  
  
   
  
Household Size 6.7 3.2 2 35 7.4 3.5 2 34 
Residence 
    
  
   
  
   Rural 
 
64.5 % 
 
  53.4 % 
 
  
   Urban 
 
35.5 % 
 
  46.6 % 
 
  
N   28,641 6,714 
          Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-III, 2005-06 
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Table 2: Percent Distribution of Stunting among Hindu and Muslim Children aged 0-
4 in India, 2005-06 
        
 
  Hindus Muslims 
Parity 
Sex of 
Previous 
Children Male Female 
Male-Female 
Diff. Male Female 
Male-Female 
Diff. 
1 - 37.6 35.7 + 39.5 38.1   
2 Male 43.8 41.4   44.7 38.5 + 
  Female 41.0 43.6 + 45.8 45.4   
3 Two Boys 51.4 45.5 + 50.7 47.7   
  Two Girls 45.7 50.8 * 41.8 43.7   
  Mixed 48.5 47.4   49.6 48.3   
4+  - 54.2 56.1   53.4 51.2   
All  - 44.2 43.8   47.0 44.8 + 
N 
 
14962 13679   3466 3248 
 
        Note: * p <0.05, + p <0.1 
       
      
All 1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+
Female (Ref.=Male) 1.03 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.10 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.58 0.96
Female * Previous Born, Female (Ref.=Female * Previous Born, Male) - - 1.22+ - - - - 1.03 - -
Female * Previous Born, Two Females (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 1.46* - - - - 1.55 -
Female * Previous Born, Two Males (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 0.73 - - - - 1.54 -
N 28641 9567 8556 4697 5821 6714 1700 1663 1117 2228
** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.1
Note: Models are state-fixed effects, and control for child's age, maternal age, maternal education, spouse's education, maternal employment, total family size, urban/rural residence, and household wealth.
Note: Stunting is height-for-age <2 SDs from median height of 2005 WHO Reference Population.
Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, 2005-06.
Hindu Muslim
Parity
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results Showing the Odds of Being Stunted for Hindu and Muslim Children Aged 0-4 in India, 2005-06
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Table 4: Predicted Probabilites of Stunting among Hindu and Muslim 
Children aged 0-4 in India, 2005-06  
     Hindus Muslim 
Parity Sex of Previous Children Male Female Male Female 
1 - 41.1 40.9 44.1 42.9 
2 Male 47.2 45.6 45.1 43.4 
  Female 44.6 47.6 49.4 48.4 
3 Two Boys 53.1 48.1 55.5 55.5 
  Two Girls 50.3 56.7 50.1 50.0 
  Mixed 50.6 46.9 61.7 50.7 
4+ All 56.2 58.2 55.9 55.0 
All   47.7 48.3 51.0 49.2 
    
    
      Note: Predicted probabilities are based on logistic regression models with state-fixed 
effects, and control for child’s age, parental education, maternal employment, total family 
size, urban/rural residence, and household wealth. 
Source: National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)-III, 2005-06. 
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Table 5: Percent Distribution of Full Immunization among Hindu and Muslim 
Children aged 1-4 in India, 2005-06 
 
 
  Hindus Muslims 
Parity 
Sex of 
Previous 
Children Male Female 
Male-Female 
Diff. Male 
Femal
e Male-Female Diff. 
1 - 64.5 62.1 * 52.2 47.8   
2 Male 57.3 57.0   46.3 46.7   
  Female 59.2 56.7 + 50.7 48.0   
3 Two Boys 46.5 47.4   35.8 35.6   
  Two Girls 54.3 45.2 *** 51.1 42.3   
  Mixed 48.1 45.6   36.1 34.2   
4+ - 34.4 31.4 * 26.1 25.9   
All - 53.9 51.7 *** 40.4 38.7   
N 
 
12323 11037   2857 2663 
 
	          *** p <0.001, * p <0.05, + p <0.1	  
 
All 1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+
Female (Ref.=Male) 0.94+ 0.89+ 1.18+ 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.84 1.00
Female * Previous Born, Female (Ref.=Female * Previous Born, Male) - - 0.78+ - - - - 0.90 - -
Female * Previous Born, Two Females (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 1.13 - - - - 0.88 -
Female * Previous Born, Two Males (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 0.79 - - - - 0.59 -
Maternal Education (Ref.=None)
   Primary 1.37**
   Secondary 1.79**
   Higher 2.70**
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%)
   Lower 1.35** 1.19
   Middle 20% 1.93** 1.31
   Richer 2.08** 1.99**
   Richest 20% 3.11** 2.39**
N 23360 7745 6971 3842 4790 5520 1365 1371 929 1813
** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.1
Note: Models are state-fixed effects, and control for child's age, maternal age, maternal education, spouse's education, maternal employment, total family size, urban/rural residence, and household wealth.
Note: Full immunization consists of BCG, measles, and three doses each of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus and polio by the age of 1.
Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, 2005-06.
Table 6: Logistic Regression Results Showing the Odds of Being Fully Immunized for Hindu and Muslim Children Aged 1-4 in India, 2005-06
Parity
Hindu Muslim
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Figure 1: Female-Male Difference in Predicted Probability of Stunting among 
Hindu and Muslim Children aged 0-4 in India, 2005-06   
 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on logistic regression models with state-fixed 
effects, and control for child's age, maternal education, spouse's education, maternal 
employment, total family size, urban/rural residence, and household wealth. 
Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, 2005-06. 
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Appendix Table 1: State-fixed Effects Logistic Regression Results of the Odds 
 of Stunting for Hindu and Muslim Children Aged 0-4 in India, 2005-06 
          
All Parities 
 
Hindus Muslims 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 1.03 (0.97 - 1.09) 0.92 (0.80 - 1.05) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 0.86** (0.78 - 0.95) 1.14 (0.91 - 1.42) 
   Secondary 0.78** (0.71 - 0.86) 0.96 (0.77 - 1.21) 
   Higher 0.52** (0.43 - 0.64) 0.53* (0.28 - 0.99) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.16** (1.06 - 1.27) 1.1 (0.90 - 1.35) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.07 (0.96 - 1.19) 0.82+ (0.67 - 1.00) 
   Secondary 0.91* (0.83 - 0.99) 0.79* (0.66 - 0.95) 
   Higher 0.63** (0.54 - 0.74) 0.64* (0.45 - 0.91) 
Child's Age 3.00** (2.76 - 3.25) 3.68** (3.08 - 4.40) 
Family Size 1.01** (1.00 - 1.03) 1.02+ (1.00 - 1.04) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.01 (0.94 - 1.08) 1.05 (0.86 - 1.27) 
Parity 1.02+ (1.00 - 1.04) 1.02 (0.98 - 1.06) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
 
  
     (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 0.80** (0.72 - 0.89) 0.89 (0.71 - 1.11) 
   Middle 20% 0.71** (0.63 - 0.79) 0.70** (0.53 - 0.91) 
   Richer 0.55** (0.48 - 0.62) 0.51** (0.37 - 0.71) 
   Richest 20% 0.31** (0.26 - 0.37) 0.33** (0.22 - 0.49) 
     Observations 28,641 6,714 
     
	   	   	   	   	  Parity of 1 
 
Hindus Muslims 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 0.99 (0.89 - 1.11) 0.94 (0.70 - 1.27) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 0.82* (0.69 - 0.98) 0.86 (0.56 - 1.31) 
   Secondary 0.63** (0.54 - 0.74) 0.77 (0.51 - 1.15) 
   Higher 0.44** (0.32 - 0.59) 0.28* (0.09 - 0.89) 
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Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.15+ (0.99 - 1.34) 1.15 (0.79 - 1.66) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.03 (0.84 - 1.27) 0.87 (0.55 - 1.36) 
   Secondary 0.95 (0.80 - 1.13) 0.82 (0.56 - 1.20) 
   Higher 0.74* (0.58 - 0.96) 0.51+ (0.24 - 1.07) 
Child's Age 2.68** (2.32 - 3.09) 3.29** (2.28 - 4.74) 
Family Size 1.02** (1.01 - 1.04) 1.01 (0.97 - 1.05) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
     (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.06 (0.92 - 1.22) 1.02 (0.70 - 1.48) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
 
  
     (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 0.87 (0.72 - 1.06) 0.76 (0.45 - 1.29) 
   Middle 20% 0.77* (0.63 - 0.94) 0.67 (0.39 - 1.13) 
   Richer 0.54** (0.43 - 0.68) 0.57+ (0.32 - 1.02) 
   Richest 20% 0.27** (0.20 - 0.35) 0.28** (0.14 - 0.58) 
  
  
  Observations 9,567 1,699 
	   	   	   	   	  Parity of 2 
 
Hindus Muslims 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
     Female (Ref.=Male) 0.93 (0.80 - 1.08) 0.92 (0.64 - 1.33) 
Child 1 was Female 
       (Ref.=Child 1 was Male) 0.89 (0.76 - 1.04) 1.22 (0.81 - 1.84) 
Female * Child 1 was Female  
       (Ref.=Female * Child 1 was Male) 1.22+ (0.99 - 1.53) 1.03 (0.60 - 1.79) 
     Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
       Primary 0.92 (0.77 - 1.10) 1.22 (0.83 - 1.81) 
   Secondary 0.84* (0.72 - 0.99) 1.07 (0.72 - 1.59) 
   Higher 0.60** (0.44 - 0.83) 0.61 (0.22 - 1.69) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.09 (0.94 - 1.27) 1.14 (0.78 - 1.67) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
       Primary 1.02 (0.83 - 1.26) 0.96 (0.64 - 1.44) 
   Secondary 0.85+ (0.72 - 1.01) 0.76 (0.53 - 1.09) 
   Higher 0.54** (0.42 - 0.69) 0.71 (0.37 - 1.36) 
Child's Age 3.00** (2.61 - 3.45) 3.19** (2.19 - 4.65) 
Family Size 1.01 (0.99 - 1.02) 1.03+ (0.99 - 1.07) 
Maternal Employment  
        (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.04 (0.92 - 1.18) 1.07 (0.73 - 1.55) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
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   (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
       Lower 0.71** (0.59 - 0.86) 0.77 (0.49 - 1.20) 
   Middle 20% 0.68** (0.56 - 0.83) 0.61* (0.39 - 0.96) 
   Richer 0.54** (0.44 - 0.67) 0.48** (0.28 - 0.82) 
   Richest 20% 0.38** (0.29 - 0.49) 0.33** (0.17 - 0.61) 
     Observations 8,556 1,662 
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Parity of 3 
 
Hindus Muslims 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 0.98 (0.79 - 1.21) 0.58 (0.36 - 0.94) 
Previous Born (Ref.=1 Male, 1 Female)   
     Two Males 1.16 (0.89 - 1.51) 0.90 (0.48 - 1.66) 
   Two Females 0.99 (0.79 - 1.23) 0.63+ (0.37 - 1.06) 
Female * Previous Two Children (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) 
    Female*Previous Born, Two Males 0.73 (0.50 - 1.06) 1.54 (0.68 - 3.49) 
   Female*Previous Born, Two Females 1.46* (1.04 - 2.04) 1.55 (0.69 - 3.45) 
  
  
  Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 0.86 (0.70 - 1.07) 0.98 (0.59 - 1.62) 
   Secondary 0.88 (0.71 - 1.09) 0.93 (0.56 - 1.54) 
   Higher 0.34** (0.17 - 0.68) 0.69 (0.19 - 2.47) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.20+ (0.98 - 1.48) 0.73 (0.46 - 1.16) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.24+ (0.99 - 1.56) 0.94 (0.57 - 1.54) 
   Secondary 0.88 (0.72 - 1.08) 0.89 (0.56 - 1.43) 
   Higher 0.64* (0.43 - 0.95) 1.25 (0.59 - 2.69) 
  
  
  Child's Age 3.37** (2.79 - 4.07) 4.67** (3.05 - 7.15) 
Family Size 1.02* (1.00 - 1.05) 1.04 (0.99 - 1.09) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.02 (0.87 - 1.19) 1.17 (0.76 - 1.82) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
 
  
     (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 0.80+ (0.64 - 1.01) 1.41 (0.80 - 2.47) 
   Middle 20% 0.78* (0.62 - 0.99) 0.83 (0.45 - 1.55) 
   Richer 0.59** (0.44 - 0.79) 0.47* (0.23 - 0.97) 
   Richest 20% 0.33** (0.22 - 0.48) 0.42+ (0.17 - 1.01) 
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Observations 4,697 1,104 
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Parity of 4 and More 
 
Hindus Muslims 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 1.10 (0.98 - 1.24) 0.96 (0.77 - 1.19) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 0.74** (0.61 - 0.91) 1.48+ (0.99 - 2.19) 
   Secondary 0.97 (0.78 - 1.21) 1.16 (0.75 - 1.79) 
   Higher 1.01 (0.30 - 3.37) 0.88 
(0.067 - 
11.5) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.30* (1.05 - 1.60) 1.26 (0.91 - 1.73) 
Birth Order 1.05* (1.00 - 1.10) 1.09* (1.00 - 1.18) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.05 (0.88 - 1.26) 0.68* (0.50 - 0.93) 
   Secondary 0.96 (0.83 - 1.12) 0.77+ (0.56 - 1.04) 
   Higher 0.57** (0.37 - 0.87) 0.58 (0.26 - 1.29) 
Child's Age 3.20** (2.72 - 3.77) 4.57** (3.45 - 6.05) 
Family Size 1.00 (0.98 - 1.03) 1.01 (0.97 - 1.06) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.92 (0.80 - 1.06) 0.98 (0.75 - 1.29) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
 
  
     (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 0.80** (0.67 - 0.94) 0.90 (0.65 - 1.24) 
   Middle 20% 0.60** (0.49 - 0.73) 0.71 (0.47 - 1.09) 
   Richer 0.51** (0.40 - 0.67) 0.48** (0.29 - 0.81) 
   Richest 20% 0.29** (0.19 - 0.43) 0.28** (0.15 - 0.52) 
  
  
  Observations 5,820 2,227 
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Appendix Table 2: State-fixed Effects Logistic Regression Results of the Odds 
of Full Immunization for Hindu and Muslim Children Aged 1-4 in India, 2005-06 
     All Parities 
 
Hindus Muslims 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 0.94+ (0.87 - 1.00) 0.87 (0.73 - 1.03) 
Child's Age 0.97* (0.94 - 1.00) 0.98 (0.91 - 1.06) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.37** (1.21 - 1.55) 1.61** (1.19 - 2.19) 
   Secondary 1.79** (1.59 - 2.01) 2.32** (1.78 - 3.03) 
   Higher 2.70** (2.14 - 3.42) 3.90** (1.71 - 8.93) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.18* (1.03 - 1.35) 1.32* (1.04 - 1.68) 
   Secondary 1.25** (1.11 - 1.40) 1.19 (0.93 - 1.52) 
   Higher 1.31** (1.09 - 1.57) 1.20 (0.70 - 2.05) 
Family Size 1.00 (0.98 - 1.01) 0.99 (0.96 - 1.02) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.81** (0.71 - 0.94) 1.26 (0.96 - 1.65) 
Mother's Age 1.03** (1.02 - 1.04) 1.04* (1.01 - 1.06) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.96 (0.86 - 1.06) 1.05 (0.78 - 1.41) 
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
     Lower 1.35** (1.18 - 1.54) 1.19 (0.83 - 1.71) 
   Middle 20% 1.93** (1.66 - 2.25) 1.31 (0.90 - 1.92) 
   Richer 2.08** (1.74 - 2.50) 1.99** (1.32 - 2.99) 
   Richest 20% 3.11** (2.51 - 3.86) 2.39** (1.47 - 3.89) 
Parity 0.85** (0.81 - 0.88) 0.87** (0.80 - 0.95) 
  
  
  Observations 23,360 5,520 
     
     Parity of 1 
 
Hindus Muslims 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
  
  
  Female (Ref.=Male) 0.89+ (0.79 - 1.02) 0.85 (0.62 - 1.17) 
Child's Age 0.97 (0.91 - 1.03) 1.02 (0.88 - 1.19) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.51** (1.24 - 1.84) 1.68* (1.01 - 2.80) 
   Secondary 2.10** (1.74 - 2.53) 3.02** (1.85 - 4.94) 
   Higher 3.11** (2.19 - 4.42) 5.42** (1.70 - 17.3) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.12 (0.89 - 1.41) 1.3 (0.79 - 2.13) 
   Secondary 1.34** (1.10 - 1.64) 1.13 (0.69 - 1.85) 
   Higher 1.53** (1.14 - 2.04) 1.14 (0.53 - 2.48) 
Family Size 1.00 (0.98 - 1.02) 0.99 (0.95 - 1.03) 
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Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.90 (0.75 - 1.09) 1.60* (1.08 - 2.39) 
Mother's Age 1.05** (1.03 - 1.08) 1.07* (1.01 - 1.13) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.90 (0.77 - 1.05) 1.20 (0.74 - 1.94) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
 
  
     (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 1.36** (1.09 - 1.70) 1.18 (0.63 - 2.20) 
   Middle 20% 1.59** (1.26 - 2.01) 1.76+ (0.92 - 3.36) 
   Richer 1.81** (1.37 - 2.39) 1.58 (0.81 - 3.10) 
   Richest 20% 2.41** (1.74 - 3.33) 1.92 (0.87 - 4.22) 
  
  
  Observations 7,745 1,365 
 
    
  Parity of 2 
 
Hindus Muslims 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Female (Ref.=Male) 1.18+ (0.98 - 1.41) 0.87 (0.55 - 1.39) 
Child 1 was Female 
 
  
     (Ref.=Child 1 was Male) 1.12 (0.93 - 1.35) 1.05 (0.70 - 1.58) 
Female * Child 1 was Female  
 
  
     (Ref.=Female * Child 1 was Male) 0.78+ (0.60 - 1.01) 0.90 (0.48 - 1.70) 
  
  
  Child's Age 0.95 (0.90 - 1.01) 1.09 (0.94 - 1.26) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.21+ (0.99 - 1.48) 1.27 (0.76 - 2.13) 
   Secondary 1.75** (1.46 - 2.10) 2.50** (1.58 - 3.97) 
   Higher 3.06** (2.14 - 4.36) 6.99** (1.72 - 28.5) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.05 (0.84 - 1.32) 1.66+ (0.97 - 2.85) 
   Secondary 1.08 (0.88 - 1.32) 1.65* (1.08 - 2.52) 
   Higher 1.07 (0.80 - 1.43) 0.89 (0.38 - 2.08) 
Family Size 0.99 (0.97 - 1.01) 1.01 (0.97 - 1.05) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.87 (0.71 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.72 - 1.58) 
Mother's Age 1.03** (1.01 - 1.05) 1.03 (0.98 - 1.07) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.95 (0.81 - 1.11) 0.83 (0.55 - 1.25) 
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
     Lower 1.45** (1.15 - 1.82) 1.16 (0.61 - 2.20) 
   Middle 20% 1.93** (1.51 - 2.46) 0.87 (0.48 - 1.59) 
   Richer 1.96** (1.50 - 2.57) 1.24 (0.64 - 2.41) 
   Richest 20% 3.06** (2.20 - 4.25) 1.52 (0.65 - 3.54) 
  
  
  Observations 6,971 1,371 
 
    
  Parity of 3 
 
Hindus Muslims 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Female (Ref.=Male) 0.88 (0.69 - 1.13) 0.84 (0.49 - 1.44) 
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Previous Born (Ref.=1 Male, 1 Female)   
     Two Males 0.98 (0.70 - 1.38) 1.31 (0.66 - 2.60) 
   Two Females 1.11 (0.85 - 1.45) 1.35 (0.71 - 2.54) 
Female * Previous Two Children (Ref.=Female * One Male, One 
Female) 
     Female*Previous Born, Two Males 1.13 (0.71 - 1.80) 0.88 (0.35 - 2.22) 
   Female*Previous Born, Two Females 0.79 (0.54 - 1.16) 0.59 (0.22 - 1.55) 
Child's Age 1.00 (0.92 - 1.08) 0.89 (0.73 - 1.10) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.62** (1.27 - 2.06) 1.98* (1.13 - 3.49) 
   Secondary 1.61** (1.27 - 2.05) 1.88* (1.10 - 3.22) 
   Higher 1.05 (0.54 - 2.03) 1.50 (0.21 - 10.6) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.10 (0.84 - 1.45) 1.21 (0.71 - 2.08) 
   Secondary 1.19 (0.95 - 1.51) 1.64* (1.02 - 2.62) 
   Higher 1.20 (0.80 - 1.82) 1.60 (0.49 - 5.26) 
Family Size 1.00 (0.97 - 1.04) 0.98 (0.93 - 1.04) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.61** (0.48 - 0.79) 1.59+ (0.96 - 2.62) 
Mother's Age 1.04** (1.02 - 1.07) 1.04 (0.97 - 1.10) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 0.86 (0.70 - 1.04) 0.88 (0.56 - 1.40) 
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
     Lower 0.93 (0.73 - 1.19) 0.71 (0.35 - 1.45) 
   Middle 20% 2.00** (1.51 - 2.64) 0.53+ (0.27 - 1.04) 
   Richer 2.10** (1.52 - 2.90) 0.99 (0.47 - 2.07) 
   Richest 20% 4.26** (2.69 - 6.75) 1.08 (0.41 - 2.85) 
  
  
  Observations 3,842 929 
 
    
  Parity of 4+ 
 
Hindus Muslims 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Female (Ref.=Male) 0.94 (0.80 - 1.09) 1.00 (0.75 - 1.32) 
Child's Age 0.93+ (0.87 - 1.00) 0.88+ (0.77 - 1.02) 
Maternal Education (Ref.=None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.30+ (0.99 - 1.70) 1.70* (1.09 - 2.65) 
   Secondary 1.83** (1.40 - 2.41) 2.00** (1.22 - 3.27) 
   Higher 1.75 (0.50 - 6.08) 1.27 (0.16 - 9.86) 
Husband's Education (Ref. =None) 
 
  
     Primary 1.42** (1.13 - 1.80) 1.20 (0.77 - 1.88) 
   Secondary 1.39** (1.11 - 1.74) 0.76 (0.49 - 1.17) 
   Higher 1.42 (0.89 - 2.26) 1.87 (0.63 - 5.60) 
Family Size 1.00 (0.97 - 1.03) 0.96 (0.90 - 1.02) 
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.75+ (0.56 - 1.00) 1.02 (0.63 - 1.65) 
Mother's Age 1.02 (0.99 - 1.04) 1.03 (0.99 - 1.08) 
Maternal Employment  
 
  
      (Ref.=Unemployed) 1.11 (0.90 - 1.36) 1.39 (0.85 - 2.28) 
Household Wealth Quintiles 
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   (Ref.=Poorest 20%) 
 
  
     Lower 1.52** (1.18 - 1.94) 1.62 (0.90 - 2.92) 
   Middle 20% 2.30** (1.75 - 3.01) 2.18* (1.19 - 4.00) 
   Richer 2.63** (1.80 - 3.84) 4.96** (2.45 - 10.0) 
   Richest 20% 3.09** (1.85 - 5.14) 5.82** (2.47 - 13.7) 
Parity 0.84** (0.78 - 0.91) 0.94 (0.81 - 1.10) 
  
  
  Observations 4,790 1813 
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CHAPTER 3: Son Preference and Group Majority/Minority: Comparing Hindus 
and Muslims in India and Bangladesh 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Religious beliefs are an important determinant of son preference in South Asia, and 
various studies suggest that son preference is lower among Muslims compared to Hindus. 
While various hypotheses have been posited for the role of a group’s minority status on 
its total fertility preferences, it is not clear to what extent a community’s 
minority/majority status influences a desire for sons over daughters. This paper seeks to 
answer this by comparing India and Bangladesh, both countries where the two largest 
religious groups are Hindus and Muslims with a key difference: India is majority-Hindu 
while Bangladesh is majority-Muslim. Using the last available Demographic and Health 
Surveys, this study analyzes differences between cohabiting Hindus and Muslims in the 
probability of male births conditional on parity and sex composition of previous children, 
and sex differentials in stunting. The results show that Muslims do not exhibit a son 
preference in terms of the odds of a male birth relative to a female birth either in India or 
Bangladesh. In Hindu-majority India, Hindus exhibit son preference in Hindu-majority 
clusters but not in Hindu-minority clusters. On the other hand, in Hindu-minority 
Bangladesh, Hindus exhibit behaviors suggesting son preference when they reside in 
Hindu-minority areas but not in Hindu-majority areas. Overall these results indicate that 
while important at the local level, the effect of the majority/minority status at the 
neighborhood level on son preference is influenced by the community’s status at the 
national level.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A preference for male children is known to be a characteristic of a number of countries in 
Asia. A sex ratio at birth skewed in favor of males is seen as a manifestation of this 
preference and has been widely studied in South- and South-east Asia (Guilmoto 2010). 
Various authors have indicated that the practice of prenatal sex determination followed 
by female-specific abortions, more commonly known as sex-selective abortions, is the 
most frequently used technique to deliberately influence the sex composition and number 
of children. Additionally, there are other indicators of a preference for male children that 
are less extreme and relate to overt or covert discriminatory practices that favors sons 
over daughters. These relate to sex differentials in health and nutritional outcomes, where 
girls are found to be disadvantaged compared to boys. An underlying parental bias in 
favor of sons may result in their discrimination against girls in terms of care and well-
being. While a number of papers have examined that the underlying source of this 
preference for sons lies in patrilineal kinship systems, there are fewer studies that have 
compared religious groups, which have significant differences in terms of fertility 
preferences and marriage practices. Previous research suggests that son preference is 
lower in India among Muslims compared to Hindus, and that this relates to the kinship 
system of the Muslim community which accords a higher status to women within 
households compared to Hindu families due to the practice of consanguineous marriages, 
strong links between married women and their natal homes, and inheritance laws that 
include all daughters, (Nasir and Kalla 2006; Iyer 2002; Bloom, Wypij, and Das Gupta 
2001; Mondal 1979). The focus of this paper is to examine whether the majority/minority 
status of the religious group affects son preference. In comparing India and Bangladesh, 
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this paper analyzes patterns in son preference both within-country as well as across the 
two countries which present a contrasting religious distribution of the population. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
India and Bangladesh share a long and common history. India and Bangladesh form a 
geographically contiguous region in South Asia, and since at least the Pal dynasty of 8th 
century AD, the modern-day Indian state of West Bengal and Bangladesh were part of 
the kingdom of Bengal, later including the Indian states of Bihar and Orissa under the 
Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal period, and finally under British colonial rule. Western 
Bengal held the capital city of British India, Calcutta, and thrived as an economic and 
cultural hub. It was a Hindu-majority region, in contrast to the more remote and less 
developed eastern Bengal, which was Muslim-majority. Bengal was permanently 
partitioned at the time of India’s independence from the British into the Indian state of 
West Bengal and the Pakistan province of East Bengal, which later became Bangladesh 
in 1971. India and Bangladesh have remained Hindu- and Muslim-majority respectively. 
In a population of 1.02 billion, the Census of India 2001 recorded the religious 
composition of Hindus at 80.5% and Muslims at 13.4% (Registrar General of India 
2004). By comparison, the Census of Bangladesh 2001 recorded 89.7% Muslims and 
9.2% Hindus in a total population of 130 million (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2004). 
The border between India and Bangladesh is considered to be fairly porous, and there has 
been significant migration from Bangladesh into India; the Census of India 2001 noted 
that 3 million people reported having migrated to India from Bangladesh. Assam in the 
north-East of India has the second largest  
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Recent estimates in Bangladesh peg the sex ratio at birth at 104.9 male births per 100 
female births, which is within the range one may see in the absence of influencing 
interventions (Guilmoto 2012). Sex differentials in mortality have  
 
Overall, the decline in fertility over the past two decades in Bangladesh and the 
normalization of sex ratios at birth indicate that son preference or daughter discrimination 
is not a stark demographic and social phenomenon, especially compared to neighboring 
India. However, these national indicators may mask differences between various social 
groups if there are large differences in their proportion in the total population. 
Additionally, given the contrast between India and Bangladesh in terms of the Hindu and 
Muslim proportions of population, we can examine whether son preference within 
religious groups is affected by their majority/minority status at the sub-national level.  
 
Within the demographic literature, there has been a long-standing interest in 
understanding the influence of religion on fertility, as well as the association of Islam 
with high fertility. Various studies have investigated the factors to which the higher 
Muslim fertility in South- and Southeast Asia be attributed and various hypotheses have 
related to the patriarchal nature of the religion and its impact on women’s autonomy 
(Morgan et al, 2002), differences between religions groups in underlying socioeconomic 
characteristics (Bhat and Zavier, 2005), as well as the effect of minority group status on a 
community’s integration in society and its impact on fertility preferences (Jeffery and 
Jeffery, 2002; Basu, 1996). Morgan et al (2002) found that Muslim women in South and 
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Southeast Asia (India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines) generally desire 
more and have more children, and are less likely to use contraceptive methods 
(particularly sterilization), but they did not find that attitudes and behaviors that 
supported higher fertility among Muslims were explained by differences in women’s 
autonomy. Bhat and Zavier (2005) concluded that socioeconomic differences between 
Hindus and Muslims in India explain about 25% of the difference between Hindu and the 
higher Muslim total fertility rates in rural areas, and about half of the difference in urban 
areas. They posit that there is a significant effect on fertility of religion per se, and 
although the tents of Islam do not fundamentally oppose the practice of contraception, the 
widely-held view among Muslims was that sterilization in particular was in complete 
opposition to god’s will and therefore forbidden.  
 
Religious identity and beliefs may affect health outcomes not only at the level of 
individual behaviors but also through the context of neighborhoods and communities 
within which individuals reside. Culhane and Elo (2005) conceptualize the 
‘neighborhood effect’ on health as neighborhood cohesion, civic participation, crime and 
the socioeconomic composition affecting health outcomes through the availability of 
social support, adaptation of coping strategies and exposures to chronic stress. 
Furthermore, community access to publicly provided resources and services such as 
healthcare facilities is determined not only by the economic capabilities of the residents 
but also by the extent of their political organization and ability to demand services. In the 
case of India, disadvantaged groups are found to reside in relatively homogenous 
neighborhoods – for instance, along the lines of religion or scheduled caste and tribes in 
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rural India, and especially for Muslims in urban India. Muslim populations are relatively 
concentrated geographically (Kulkarni 2010) and increasingly dense concentrations of 
Muslim locations have been seen in urban areas especially following periods of 
communal strife and unrest. Various authors have indicated that the geographic 
concentration of Muslims in various communities/districts and their community 
socioeconomic status are important factors which influence their demographic behaviors 
(Dharmalingam and Morgan 2004; Bose 2005). Social networks may be stronger in areas 
with greater homogenous concentrations, leading to more dense learning networks with a 
common ‘contextualized rationality’ in which social and cultural environments inform 
and influence behaviors (Kohler 1997). Attitudes as well as outcomes with respect to 
contraception as well as health are affected by the strength of associations, community 
norms and knowledge available through social networks (Kunitz, 2001). A number of 
different explanations have been put forth in the literature to support the hypothesis that 
the fertility difference between a minority group and the majority can be explained by the 
minority status independently of socioeconomic and demographic factors (Goldscheider 
and Uhlenberg 1969; Sahu et al 2012; Zhang 2008; Poston, Chang, and Dan 2006; Iyer 
2002). The desired family size of the members of a minority community may be 
influenced by uncertainties and concerns related to safety and discrimination (Iyer 2002; 
Johnson-Hanks 2006; Kennedy 1973), and although the hypothesis is that a quest for 
numerical strength and political influence may cause minority group members to adopt 
pronatalist behaviors, it is also possible that in these circumstances, minority group 
members adapt the practices and norms of the majority to both attain social mobility and 
diminish differences with the majority (Lehrer 2004; Kennedy 1973).  
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Despite this extensive literature on the relationship between fertility and the 
minority/majority status of a group, the issue of son preference has not been addressed 
directly. This paper takes advantage of the differences between India and Bangladesh in 
the proportion of Hindu and Muslim residents to compare son preference in the two 
groups in different minority/majority situations.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The key interest in this paper is understanding whether Hindu and Muslim behaviors 
related to son preference and sex selection, manifest in the differential odds of a male 
birth compared to a female birth and child nutritional outcomes, differ between India and 
Bangladesh, two countries with contrasting religious proportions of the total population.  
 
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are the primary source of data for this 
study. The analysis is conducted on the most recent survey available for both countries, 
pertaining to 2005-06 for India and 2011 for Bangladesh. The Indian DHS (called the 
National Family and Health Survey (NFHS)) has a nationally representative sample of 
124,285 women aged 15-49 years. The Bangladesh DHS has a nationally representative 
sample of 17,842 women aged 13-49 years. I first compare the probability of stunting 
among Hindus and Muslims in the two countries among children aged 1-4, on a sample 
of 26,313 children in India and 7,610 children in Bangladesh. In analyzing the probability 
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of a male birth, the sample is restricted to births in the five years preceding the survey, 
and includes 54,121 births in India and 8,641 births in Bangladesh. 
 
 
The majority/minority status of Hindus and Muslims is calculated at the level of the 
Demographic and Health Survey primary sampling unit, which is a village in rural areas 
and census enumeration block in urban areas in India and total about 3000, and a census 
enumeration area in Bangladesh and total 600. The sample is stratified by the 
majority/minority group status within the primary sampling unit (PSU) or cluster. The 
variable is at the level of the survey PSU, where the proportion of the Hindu and Muslim 
members of the cluster are calculated from the total cluster population. I conduct the 
analysis in both India and Bangladesh in Hindu majority (Hindus >50% of the PSU 
population), Muslim majority (Muslims >50% of the PSU population), as well as two 
additional levels, Hindus/Muslims less than 25% and greater than 75% to understand if 
any effect gets attenuated as the geographical concentration of the group becomes greater 
or lower. Out of all 29 states covered in the Indian DHS of 2005-06, Hindus and Muslims 
form the two largest religious groups in 18 states, that constitute about 85% of the total 
Indian population. Of these, Jammu and Kashmir is the only state where Muslims 
outnumber Hindus. In 3 other states – Haryana, Orissa and Tamil Nadu – the difference 
between the second largest group (Sikhs or Christians) and Muslims is less than 4%, and 
as such I include these 3 states in the analysis. Eight states excluded from the analysis are 
where Muslims are a distant third behind the two largest religious groups – Sikhs and 
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Hindus (Punjab) or Christian and Hindus (Goa, Sikkim, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh).  
 
I use two dependent variables in this analysis. The first relates to sex differential in 
stunting, and the second to fertility preferences, measured in terms of the differential 
odds of having a boy rather than a girl in the five years preceding the survey. The 
relatively small sample for Bangladesh does not permit disaggregated analysis of sex 
differentials in stunting by the majority/minority status at the cluster level. Hence, only 
fertility preferences are analyzed by cluster. 
 
Stunting: The dependent variable for stunting is operationalized as a dichotomous 
variable, which takes the value of 1 for children whose height-for-age is less than 2 
standard deviations below the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards. Height-for-
age is an indicator of cumulative nutritional intake and is affected over a period of time 
by nutrition as well chronic ailments (WHO 2006). Height-for-age is an indicator of 
cumulative nutritional intake and is affected over a period of time by nutrition as well 
chronic ailments and is not affected in the short-term (WHO Multicentre Growth 
Reference Study Group 2006; Deaton and Dreze 2008). 
 
Actual Fertility Behavior: In order to study sex preferences for children manifest in 
actual fertility behaviors, I study the differential odds of a having a boy rather than a girl 
among women who gave birth in the five years preceding the survey. Of particular 
interest is the comparison of second- and third-order births conditional on the sex of 
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previous children with first births, i.e. with no previous children. Odds of a male birth 
that are greater than the biologically expected average of 1.05 would indicate a deliberate 
effort to influence the sex of the child.  
 
RESULTS 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the first dependent variable of stunting, with the 
bivariate table not showing any statistically significant sex differentials. Table 2 presents 
the bivariate distribution of the control variables for the regression models.  We note that 
in Bangladesh more women are likely to have attained some primary schooling as well as 
some high schooling, compared to India. Interestingly unlike India where Muslims are 
more likely to live in urban areas, the proportion of Hindus and Muslims living in urban 
areas in Bangladesh is lower and about the same.   
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Table 3, we see the main coefficients of interests from the multivariate logistic 
regression models of stunting. We see that in India, girls at all parities have higher odds 
of being stunted compared to boys although the effect is only marginally significant at the 
10% level. However at parity of 3, girls born when both previous children were also 
female have significantly higher odds of being stunted compared to girls born after a 
combination of a boy and a girl. These differences do not exist for Muslims in India. The 
odds of stunting are marginally significant at 1.53 (the product of the odds of Female and 
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Female*Previous born were both female) for girls at parity of 3. In Bangladesh once 
again we see that Hindu girls are more likely to be nutritionally disadvantaged, with girls 
at the parity of 2 more likely to be stunted when the previous child was also female, 
compared to when the previous child was male. Although the sample is relatively small, 
the odds of stunting are significant at 1.375 (the product of the odds of female and 
female*previous child was female), and once again we do not see any significant sex 
differentials for Muslims. The earlier parity at which we see a female disadvantage in 
nutrition in India compared to Bangladesh likely indicates the lower fertility levels in 
Bangladesh compared to India on average. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results of multivariate logistic regression models for the probability of a male birth are 
shown for India in Table 4 and Bangladesh in Table 5. The key explanatory variables are 
the number and sex composition of previous children, where deliberate actions to ensure 
that a male child be born would be reflected in greater odds of a male birth. We note that 
the fertility behaviors of Muslims overall, either in India or Bangladesh and irrespective 
of their majority/minority status in the community do not reflect son preference. On other 
hand, for Hindus in India, we see evidence for sex selection at parity of two when the 
previous born is female, as well as for parity of three, when the previous two children are 
female. This is true when Hindus are the majority in the cluster, but interestingly not 
when Hindus are in the minority in India. In contrast, in Bangladesh, the results show that 
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in cluster where Hindus are the minority, they have a strong preference for sons with 
significantly greater odds of a male birth for all second-order births.  
[TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Thus, to summarize: Muslims do not exhibit a son preference in terms of the odds of a 
male birth relative to a female birth either in India or Bangladesh. In Hindu-majority 
India, Hindus exhibit son preference in Hindu-majority clusters but not in Hindu-minority 
clusters. In Hindu-minority Bangladesh, Hindus exhibit behaviors suggesting son 
preference when they reside in Hindu-minority areas but not in Hindu-majority areas.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The results presented here indicate that in Hindus in India who live in Muslim-majority 
areas appear to be influenced by the absence of son preference of the majority Muslim 
community and subscribe to behaviors with greater gender equality. This is not the case 
however in the Muslim-majority areas of Bangladesh, where son preference among 
Hindus remains strong.  
 
In India where Hindus are the majority at the national- and most state-levels, Hindus that 
live in Muslim-majority clusters are in a unique situation. The social and cultural 
environment from which their own preferences and behaviors are influenced is one where 
the majority Muslim community demonstrates significantly low daughter aversion. A 
strong desire for more sons is no longer a critical requirement for Hindus in these areas, 
since they derive their political and social strength from being a majority community at 
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the state- and national levels. On the other hand, in neighborhoods when Hindus are a 
minority in a Hindu-minority country, the community may have stronger and closer-knit 
networks, greater neighborhood-level cohesion and aligning of values, all of which may 
be influenced by a threat perception that enables the reinforcement of traditional social 
norms. The findings of this paper suggest that the minority group status hypothesis that 
has earlier related primarily to total fertility preferences can be extended to son 
preference as well. Importantly, the majority/minority status of a group appears to matter 
at the level of the neighborhood as well as the level of the country as a whole. Son 
preference is influenced strongly by the context. Overall, this study also indicates that a 
deeper understanding of the influence of national majority/minority status on the 
preferences and behaviors of communities at the sub-national level is called for. 
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Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Stunting among Hindu and Muslim Children 
aged 1-4 in India, 2005-06, and Bangladesh, 2011 
 
        India 
 
  Hindus Muslims 
Parity 
Sex of 
Previous 
Children Male Female 
Male-Female 
Diff. Male Female 
Male-
Female 
Diff. 
1 - 37.6 35.7 + 39.5 38.1 - 
2 Male 43.8 41.4 - 44.7 38.5 + 
  Female 41.0 43.6 + 45.8 45.4 - 
3 Two Boys 51.4 45.5 + 50.7 47.7 - 
  Two Girls 45.7 50.8 + 41.8 43.7 - 
  Mixed 48.5 47.4 - 49.6 48.3 - 
4+   54.2 56.1 - 53.4 51.2 - 
All   48.5 48.9 - 52.0 49.8 - 
N   12323 11037   2857 2663   
        Bangladesh 
 
  Hindus Muslims 
Parity 
Sex of 
Previous 
Children Male Female 
Male-Female 
Diff. Male Female 
Male-
Female 
Diff. 
1 - 33.7 35.7 - 39.1 37.0 - 
2 Male 45.1 26.1 - 40.8 38.7 - 
  Female 37.2 42.5 - 36.8 42.9 + 
3 Two Boys 41.6 45.8 - 37.9 39.8 - 
  Two Girls 20.6 29.4 - 36.5 46.4 - 
  Mixed 28.1 33.8 - 42.9 47.5 - 
4+   44.1 47.5 - 48.1 52.8 - 
All   36.8 36.2 - 40.8 42.6 - 
N   365 367   3524 3362   
        Note: * p <0.05, + p <0.1 
   Note: Stunting is height-for-age <2 SDs from median height of 2005 WHO Child Growth Charts. 
Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, India, 2005-06, and Demographic and Health Survey, 
2011, Bangladesh. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
        India Bangladesh 
   Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim 
 Demographic Characteristics 
 
      
 Age 29.2 30.2 32.1 30.5 
 Schooling 
 
  
 
  
    None 40.2% 47.3% 25.9% 27.6% 
    Some Primary 14.6% 15.7% 25.3% 30.5% 
    Some Secondary 37.5% 33.5% 38.3% 34.9% 
    Higher 7.7% 3.5% 10.5% 7.0% 
 Employed 38.2% 24.1% 18.0% 12.6% 
 Household Characteristics 
 
  
 
  
 Household Size 6.1 6.9 5.6 5.5 
 Residence 
 
  
 
  
    Rural 68.8% 59.5% 74.8% 73.7% 
    Urban 31.2% 40.5% 25.2% 26.3% 
 Media Exposure 
 
  
 
  
    None 22.8% 28.9% 14.0% 12.5% 
    Low 16.3% 18.0% 29.7% 35.3% 
    High 60.9% 53.2% 56.3% 52.2% 
 Fertility History 
 
  
 
  
    Sons Ever Born 1.16 1.32 1.16 1.33 
    Daughters Ever Born 1.07 1.23 1.11 1.27 
 N 86,062 15,848 1,896 15,615 
 
      Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, India, 2005-06, and Demographic and Health Survey, 
 2011, Bangladesh. 
      
All 1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+
Female (Ref.=Male) 1.06+ 1.02 1.05 1.04 1.10 0.94 1.06 0.86 0.58* 0.96
Female * Previous Born, Female (Ref.=Female * Previous Born, Male) - - 1.08 - - - - 1.03 - -
Female * Previous Born, Two Females (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 1.48* - - - - 1.54 -
Female * Previous Born, Two Males (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 0.73 - - - - 1.41 -
N 21,223 6,940 6,289 3,483 4,511 5,090 1,246 1,261 861 1,716
All 1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+
Female (Ref.=Male) 0.94 0.93 0.25* 8.2+ 1.25 1.07 0.91 0.97 1.18 1.06
Female * Previous Born, Female (Ref.=Female * Previous Born, Male) - - 5.5* - - - - 1.28 - -
Female * Previous Born, Two Females (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 0.01+ - - - - 1.43 -
Female * Previous Born, Two Males (Ref.=Female * One Male, One Female) - - - 0.12 - - - - 0.86 -
N 730 250 185 90 62 6,880 1,861 1,614 958 1,118
** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.1
Note: Models are state-fixed effects (India) and administrative division-fixed effects (Bangladesh), and control for child's age, maternal age, maternal education, spouse's education, maternal employment, total family size, urban/rural residence, and household wealth.
Note: Stunting is height-for-age <2 SDs from median height of 2005 WHO Child Growth Charts.
Source: National Family and Health Survey- III, India, 2005-06, and Demographic and Health Survey, 2011, Bangladesh.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results Showing the Odds of Being Stunted for Hindu and Muslim Children Aged 1-4 in India, 2005-06, and Bangladesh, 2011
India
Bangladesh
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Parity
Hindu Muslim
Parity
Hindu Muslim
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Children Previously Born (Ref. = None)
  One, Boy 0.93+ (0.87 - 1.00) 0.95 (0.80 - 1.13) 0.95 (0.88 - 1.02) 0.71* (0.52 - 0.96) 0.61** (0.42 - 0.87) 1.09 (0.89 - 1.34)
  One, Girl 1.11** (1.03 - 1.19) 1.07 (0.91 - 1.26) 1.11** (1.03 - 1.20) 1.11 (0.81 - 1.52) 1.00 (0.64 - 1.58) 1.07 (0.88 - 1.31)
  Two or more, boys 0.98 (0.84 - 1.13) 1.24 (0.96 - 1.60) 0.97 (0.83 - 1.12) 1.35 (0.80 - 2.30) 1.27 (0.65 - 2.50) 1.21 (0.90 - 1.63)
  Two or more, girls 1.19** (1.06 - 1.33) 1.00 (0.76 - 1.31) 1.19** (1.06 - 1.33) 0.95 (0.57 - 1.60) 1.32 (0.71 - 2.45) 1.05 (0.76 - 1.45)
  Two or more, both 1.07 (0.97 - 1.18) 0.90 (0.74 - 1.10) 1.05 (0.95 - 1.16) 0.68* (0.46 - 1.00) 1.45 (0.87 - 2.42) 1.02 (0.80 - 1.28)
  Four or More 1.08+ (0.99 - 1.17) 1.04 (0.88 - 1.23) 1.09+ (1.00 - 1.18) 0.85 (0.61 - 1.19) 0.90 (0.56 - 1.43) 1.15 (0.95 - 1.38)
Age 1.00 (1.00 - 1.01) 0.99 (0.98 - 1.00) 1.00 (1.00 - 1.01) 1.00 (0.98 - 1.03) 1.03 (0.99 - 1.06) 0.99+ (0.97 - 1.00)
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 0.99 (0.94 - 1.05) 0.95 (0.84 - 1.07) 0.98 (0.92 - 1.04) 0.78+ (0.61 - 1.01) 1.43* (1.07 - 1.91) 1.02 (0.89 - 1.18)
Maternal Education (Ref.=None)
   Primary 1.01 (0.94 - 1.09) 1.12 (0.96 - 1.29) 1.02 (0.95 - 1.09) 1.06 (0.78 - 1.44) 0.79 (0.51 - 1.21) 1.13 (0.96 - 1.32)
   Secondary 0.99 (0.93 - 1.06) 1.06 (0.93 - 1.22) 0.99 (0.92 - 1.06) 0.95 (0.73 - 1.23) 1.28 (0.90 - 1.82) 1.11 (0.95 - 1.29)
   Higher 0.99 (0.87 - 1.13) 1.13 (0.78 - 1.62) 1.01 (0.88 - 1.15) 1.35 (0.69 - 2.67) 0.75 (0.38 - 1.46) 1.04 (0.68 - 1.60)
Husband's Education (Ref. =None)
   Primary 0.99 (0.92 - 1.07) 0.93 (0.81 - 1.06) 0.99 (0.92 - 1.07) 0.93 (0.71 - 1.22) 0.81 (0.52 - 1.28) 0.92 (0.79 - 1.09)
   Secondary 1.01 (0.95 - 1.08) 0.92 (0.79 - 1.07) 1.02 (0.96 - 1.09) 0.95 (0.73 - 1.23) 0.69* (0.48 - 0.97) 0.91 (0.76 - 1.09)
   Higher 0.99 (0.89 - 1.10) 0.85 (0.66 - 1.09) 0.99 (0.89 - 1.11) 0.73 (0.42 - 1.26) 0.88 (0.49 - 1.57) 0.88 (0.65 - 1.18)
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%)
   Lower 1.04 (0.97 - 1.12) 1.01 (0.86 - 1.19) 1.05 (0.98 - 1.12) 1.23 (0.87 - 1.74) 0.96 (0.61 - 1.50) 0.96 (0.80 - 1.14)
   Middle 20% 1.06 (0.98 - 1.14) 1.11 (0.95 - 1.29) 1.06 (0.98 - 1.15) 1.33+ (0.97 - 1.83) 0.88 (0.53 - 1.47) 1.04 (0.87 - 1.24)
   Richer 1.15** (1.06 - 1.26) 1.01 (0.84 - 1.21) 1.16** (1.06 - 1.27) 1.11 (0.77 - 1.60) 1.00 (0.63 - 1.60) 0.98 (0.79 - 1.23)
   Richest 20% 1.18** (1.06 - 1.31) 1.10 (0.86 - 1.40) 1.19** (1.07 - 1.33) 1.24 (0.79 - 1.93) 0.84 (0.50 - 1.41) 1.06 (0.79 - 1.42)
Employed 1.02 (0.99 - 1.06) 1.00 (0.92 - 1.09) 1.03 (0.99 - 1.07) 0.89+ (0.79 - 1.01) 0.94 (0.79 - 1.12) 1.06 (0.95 - 1.18)
Total Family Size 1.00 (0.99 - 1.00) 1.00 (0.99 - 1.02) 1.00 (0.99 - 1.00) 0.99 (0.97 - 1.02) 0.99 (0.95 - 1.02) 1.01 (0.99 - 1.02)
Observations
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: National Family and Health Survey-III, India, 2005-06.
Hindu Muslim
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Table 4: Odds of a Male Birth Among All Births in Hindu and Muslim Households in India 2001-2006
Clusters with a Hindu Majority
Hindu Muslim
42,184 2,622 1,462 7,80243,662 10,459
All Areas Clusters with a Muslim Majority
Hindu Muslim
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Children Previously Born (Ref. = None)
  One, Boy 1.61* (1.02 - 2.52) 0.92 (0.77 - 1.09) 1.09 (0.55 - 2.17) 1.11 (0.32 - 3.89) 2.56** (1.40 - 4.68) 0.93 (0.67 - 1.31)
  One, Girl 1.27 (0.81 - 2.01) 0.94 (0.79 - 1.12) 1.17 (0.56 - 2.43) 2.27 (0.72 - 7.21) 2.00* (1.10 - 3.63) 0.99 (0.71 - 1.38)
  Two or more, boys 1.42 (0.55 - 3.62) 1.19 (0.89 - 1.58) 0.47 (0.055 - 3.98) 1.14 (0.27 - 4.77) 2.24 (0.65 - 7.73) 1.01 (0.58 - 1.76)
  Two or more, girls 0.88 (0.40 - 1.94) 1.01 (0.77 - 1.34) 0.99 (0.25 - 3.91) 1.23 (0.21 - 7.13) 1.34 (0.41 - 4.31) 0.85 (0.50 - 1.46)
  Two or more, both 0.93 (0.46 - 1.88) 1.09 (0.87 - 1.37) 0.42 (0.087 - 2.00) 1.42 (0.24 - 8.36) 1.35 (0.55 - 3.31) 0.94 (0.61 - 1.46)
  Four or More 1.04 (0.47 - 2.29) 0.95 (0.76 - 1.18) 0.4 (0.082 - 1.91) 0.76 (0.17 - 3.40) 2.81 (0.85 - 9.26) 0.84 (0.54 - 1.30)
Age 1.02 (0.98 - 1.07) 1.00 (0.99 - 1.01) 1.06 (0.99 - 1.14) 0.96 (0.87 - 1.07) 0.99 (0.93 - 1.04) 1.00 (0.98 - 1.03)
Urban (Ref.=Rural) 1.22 (0.81 - 1.86) 0.98 (0.86 - 1.12) 3.56** (1.62 - 7.83) 1.25 (0.43 - 3.63) 0.65 (0.35 - 1.22) 1.03 (0.83 - 1.28)
Maternal Education (Ref.=None)
   Primary 0.74 (0.47 - 1.16) 1.02 (0.87 - 1.21) 0.79 (0.30 - 2.11) 1.04 (0.23 - 4.64) 0.48 (0.23 - 1.02) 1.11 (0.82 - 1.50)
   Secondary 0.73 (0.45 - 1.19) 0.99 (0.82 - 1.20) 0.56 (0.23 - 1.36) 1.05 (0.27 - 4.06) 0.56 (0.26 - 1.18) 0.92 (0.65 - 1.29)
   Higher 0.86 (0.37 - 2.01) 0.98 (0.73 - 1.33) 0.19* (0.037 - 1.00) 1.16 (0.064 - 21.0) 1.25 (0.40 - 3.90) 0.78 (0.47 - 1.29)
Husband's Education (Ref. =None)
   Primary 2.00** (1.23 - 3.25) 1.09 (0.94 - 1.26) 1.31 (0.50 - 3.43) 2.13 (0.79 - 5.74) 4.65*** (2.42 - 8.92) 1.24 (0.92 - 1.68)
   Secondary 1.79* (1.06 - 3.03) 1.01 (0.86 - 1.17) 2.61 (0.90 - 7.55) 2.07 (0.72 - 5.93) 2.43* (1.14 - 5.19) 1.08 (0.81 - 1.44)
   Higher 1.98 (0.96 - 4.08) 1.11 (0.89 - 1.38) 3.26 (0.86 - 12.3) 1.37 (0.23 - 8.24) 2.23 (0.79 - 6.33) 1.61* (1.05 - 2.47)
Household Wealth Quintiles (Ref.=Poorest 20%)
   Lower 0.56* (0.32 - 0.99) 1.01 (0.85 - 1.19) 0.61 (0.31 - 1.22) 0.75 (0.20 - 2.90) 0.65 (0.26 - 1.63) 1.20 (0.84 - 1.70)
   Middle 20% 0.63 (0.38 - 1.04) 1.01 (0.86 - 1.20) 0.48 (0.20 - 1.19) 0.41 (0.15 - 1.09) 0.95 (0.42 - 2.15) 1.27 (0.89 - 1.80)
   Richer 0.67 (0.37 - 1.22) 0.95 (0.80 - 1.14) 0.71 (0.21 - 2.39) 0.70 (0.20 - 2.42) 0.81 (0.33 - 1.96) 1.05 (0.75 - 1.49)
   Richest 20% 0.66 (0.34 - 1.28) 1.07 (0.87 - 1.33) 0.42 (0.14 - 1.26) 1.13 (0.16 - 7.76) 1.58 (0.58 - 4.27) 1.01 (0.67 - 1.53)
Employed 1.13 (0.73 - 1.77) 0.89 (0.73 - 1.07) 0.57 (0.24 - 1.34) 0.27* (0.086 - 0.88) 1.57 (0.86 - 2.85) 0.92 (0.65 - 1.29)
Total Family Size 0.99 (0.94 - 1.04) 1.00 (0.98 - 1.02) 0.98 (0.84 - 1.14) 0.95 (0.76 - 1.19) 1.00 (0.93 - 1.07) 1.01 (0.98 - 1.05)
Observations
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Models are administrative division-fixed effects.
Source: Demographic and Health Survey, Bangladesh, 2011
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Table 5: Odds of a Male Birth Among All Births in Hindu and Muslim Households in Bangladesh 2006-2011
All Areas Clusters with a Hindu Majority Clusters with a Muslim Majority
Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
2,435797 7,844 265 163
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